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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah 
Code Annotated (1996), and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue 1. The questions whether the services agreement had been 
modified and whether Cook breached the modified Services Agreement were properly 
submitted to the jury as issues of fact. 
Standard of Appellate Review: Whether the Services Agreement in this case 
could be orally modified is a question of law with no deference given to the trial court's 
ruling. See Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). If the Court determines 
that the Agreement could be orally modified, the issue of whether it was modified is a 
question of fact. See Colonial Pacific Leasing Corp. v. J.W.C. J.R. Corp., 1999 UT App. 
91 J^ 27, 977 P.2d 541. "Findings of fact... shall not be set aside unless clearly 
eiToneous[.]" Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
Issue 2. The attorney fees provision of the modified Services 
Agreement formed a proper basis for the trial court's attorney fees award to RTNC. 
Standard of Appellate Review: Whether the attorney fees provision 
contained in the modified Services Agreement allowed an award of attorney fees to 
RTNC is a question of law, again subject to the correctness standard with no deference to 
the trail court's ruling. See Orton, 970 P.2d at 1256. 
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Issue 3. Were the trial court's Findings of Fact made in conjunction 
with its award of attorney fees to RTNC clearly erroneous? 
Standard of Appellate Review: What standard of appellate review applies 
to a trial court's ruling is a question of law. See State v. Pemu 869 P.2d 932, 936-939 
(Utah 1994). A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed on appeal according to a 
'clearly erroneous' standard. See In re Estate of Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969, 977-978 
(Utah 1996). Under the 'clearly erroneous' standard, Cook was required to: (i) marshal 
all of the evidence which supports the trial court's findings; and (ii) demonstrate that the 
trial court's findings were "clearly erroneous in light of the great weight of the evidence" 
or otherwise persuade this Court such that it was "definitely and firmly convinced that a 
mistake has been made." Knickerbocker. 912 P.2d at 977. Whether or not Cook met this 
burden is a question of law. See Pena. 869 P.2d at 936-939. 
Issue 4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding attorney 
fees to RTNC? 
Standaird of Appellate Review: A trial court necessarily has broad 
discretion in awarding attorney fees and will not be overturned unless it abuses that 
discretion. See Richard Barton Enterprises. Inc. v. Tsern. 928 P.2d 368, 381 (Utah 
1996). This broad discretion is in deference to the fact that the trial court is in a better 
position to judge the factors relevant to such an award. See id. 
A trial court abuses its discretion when it exceeds the measure of discretion 
granted it by law or legal principles. See Pena. 869 P.2d at 936-939. To demonstrate an 
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"abuse of discretion," Cook must show that there was "no reasonable basis" for the trial 
court's decision, see Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange. 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 
1993), or that the decision was "arbitrary and capricious" see Kunzler v. O'Dell 855 
P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Whether Cook has made such a showing is a 
question of law. See id; Crookston. 860 P.2d at 938. 
Issue 5. Did the trial court err in ruling that Cook was not a prevailing 
party for purposes of awarding attorney fees? 
Standard of Appellate Review: Whether a party is a prevailing party and 
entitled to attorney fees under a contract or statute is a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. See Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Associates. 910 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case: Course of Proceedings: Disposition Below 
This action arises out of the failure of Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook 
for Congress Committee (hereinafter collectively "Cook") to pay the R.T. Nielson Co. 
("RTNC") for services rendered and expenses incurred on behalf of Cook and his 1996 
congressional campaign. 
The parties entered into a written Services Agreement in March 1996. The 
Agreement required RTNC to provide full campaign services to Cook during the 
convention cycle of the 1996 campaign, but only limited services during the primary and 
general election cycles of the campaign. The parties thereafter orally modified their 
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Agreement on two occasions, once as the campaign was moving into the primary election 
cycle, and again when it was moving into the general election cycle. Each time, Cook 
asked RTNC to provide full services to his campaign, rather than the limited service for 
which Cook had originally contracted. 
RTNC provided all of the services for which Cook had contracted under the 
parties' modified Agreement and, due in large measure to its efforts, Cook won elective 
public office for the first time ever after six tries. After Cook's victory in the November 
1996 General Election, RTNC's office and personnel served as Cook's transition office in 
Utah as he prepared to enter Congress in 1997. RTNC regularly invoiced Cook for its 
services and expenses throughout 1996. Cook, who directed payments to specific 
invoices, made at least some payment on all of the invoices which he would later contest. 
Following his election to office, Cook refused to pay the $194,000 balance 
owed on outstanding invoices and claimed that RTNC owed him monies. Suit was filed 
by RTNC in January 1997. Before Cook filed his responsive pleading, RTNC voluntarily 
dismissed its lawsuit and the matter was submitted to mediation before Paul Felt. The 
Felt mediation failed and suit was again filed by RTNC in July 1997. In his responsive 
pleading, Cook denied that the parties had orally modified their contract and 
counterclaimed against RTNC and its principal, Ronald Nielson, seeking damages or set-
offs in excess of $290,000. 
In early 1999, Cook replaced his counsel A court-ordered mediation 
before Judge David Roth (Ret.) in August 1999 failed. Prior to trial, RTNC obtained 
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summary judgment as to three of Cook's nine counterclaims, and defeated a motion for 
partial summary judgment filed by Cook. 
The case was tried to a jury in April 2000. The jury found that Cook and 
RTNC had modified their contract as alleged by RTNC and that Cook had breached that 
modified contract, damaging RTNC in the approximate sum of $183,000. It also found 
that Cook had been unjustly enriched by RTNC's post-election services in the 
approximate amount of $11,500. The jury also found that RTNC had in two instances 
breached the parties' contract as alleged by Cook and that Cook had been damaged in the 
approximate sum of $19,500, but it rejected Cook's remaining claims against RTNC and 
Ron Nielson. 
After trial, Cook again replaced his counsel. Both parties sought attorney 
fees under the attorney fees provision of the modified Services Agreement. The trial 
court ruled that RTNC was the only prevailing party in the litigation and awarded RTNC 
$196,000 in attorney fees. Cook appealed from two judgments in this matter. The first 
time from the trial court's May 31, 2000, interim judgment, later vacated, and a second 
time from the trial court's final judgment dated December 20, 2000. Cook's only 
docketing statement was filed in July 2000. 
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Statement of Facts 
Facts Related to Contract Modification Issues 
1. The jury received 45 jury instructions which were drafted, and 
consented to, by counsel for RTNC and counsel for Cook. [R. 1968-2015] 
2. Of that set, Jury Instruction No. 22 provided: 
FORM OF CONTRACT 
A contract or modification of a contract may be written or oral. 
[Addendum 1;R. 1990] 
3. In addition, Jury Instruction No. 24 provided: 
ORAL MODIFICATION OF WRITTEN CONTRACT 
Parties to a written contract are free to modify that contract by 
oral or verbal agreement, even though the written contract may 
prohibit oral or verbal modifications or require that modifications be 
in writing. [Addendum 1; R.1992] 
4. Cook's counsel at no time objected to these jury instructions to the 
trial court. [R. 2502, at pp. 134-140; R. 2503, at pp. 3-4, 81-93] 
5. Further, the jury received a special verdict form which was drafted, 
and consented to, by counsel for RTNC and counsel for Cook. [Addendum 2; R. 1941-
1947] This special verdict form contained, inter alia, the following special 
interrogatories both of which were answered in the affirmative by the jury: 
R.T. Nielson Co.'s Claims: 
1. Did the R.T. Nielson Co. and Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook for 
Congress Committee modify their Services Agreement as alleged by 
the R.T. Nielson Co.? 
2. . . . If your answer to 1. Is "Yes", did Merrill Cook and the Merrill 
Cook for Congress Committee breach their contract with the R.T. 
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Nielson Co. as modified by failing to pay the R.T. Nielson Co. as 
agreed and/or violating the covenant of good faith and fair dealing? 
[Addendum 2; R. 1941-1942; R. 2503, at pp. 86-87] 
6. Cook's counsel at no time objected to any part of this special verdict 
form to the trial court. [R. 2502, at pp. 134-140; R. 2503, at pp. 81-93] 
7. Other than the Fourteenth AfQrmative Defense in his Answer to 
RTNC's Complaint, Cook did not raise the argument that the written Services Agreement 
could not be orally modified as a matter of law and that no cause of action exists for 
breach of the Services Agreement as orally modified in the trial court below. [R 73] 
8. The attorney fees provision contained in the Modified Services 
Agreement provides: 
Attorney Fees. The prevailing party to any litigation brought 
to enforce any provision of this agreement shall be awarded 
its costs and attorney fees. 
See Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P, at ^  14. 
Facts Related to RTNC Attorney Fees Award 
9. The trial court entered an interim, non-final judgment in favor of 
RTNC on May 31, 2000, but vacated that judgment on August 8, 2000. [R. 2226-2228] 
10. Cook appealed from the May 31, 2000 judgment [R. 2354-2355] and 
filed a docketing statement on July 2000. The docketing statement did not list the trial 
court's award of attorney fees to RTNC as an issue presented on appeal. 
11. On December 22, 2000, the trial court entered final judgment for 
RTNC. [No Record Reference] 
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12. On January 5, 2001, Cook appealed the December 22, 2000 
judgment. [No Record Reference] 
13. Also on January 5, 2001, Cook filed in this Court a Motion to 
Consolidate Appeals [No Record Reference] and therein stated: 
[G]iven that this appeal began last June, the lower court's December 20, 
2000, judgment is similar to the earlier judgment from which judgment is 
taken, [fii] and the docketing statement and other preparatory action 
have been completed, Appellants request that the briefing schedule for the 
consolidated appeal remain the same . . . 
[fii] As noted above, the only substantive difference was that the lower 
court awarded Appellee an award of approximately $195,000 in attorney 
fees. 
Facts Related to Marshaling of Evidence 
f. In awarding attorney fees to RTNC, the trial court made, inter alia, 
the following express findings of fact [Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law re Attorneys Fees (hereinafter "Findings")]: 
9. The bulk of RTNCs claims and of Cook's counterclaims arose out 
of the election phase. This phase encompassed at least 80% of the total 
relevant time period. Further, approximately $182,000 of RTNC s total 
claim of $194,000 (i.e., 94%) was for services rendered and expenses 
incurred during the election phase. A similar proportionality applies to 
Cook's counterclaims. 
10. There was, effectively, complete factual overlap as to the various 
claims each party asserted against the other. Specifically: 
a. RTNCs alternative claims for election phase services 
and expenses (i.e., its compensable breach of contract claim 
and its noncompensable unjust enrichment and account stated 
claims) were based upon the same facts (e.g., conversations, 
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services, expenses, invoices, payments, nonpayments, notes, 
and other evidence from the election phase). 
b. Cook's compensable breach of contract claim and his 
noncompensable claims regarding the election phase were 
based on these same facts. 
In short, the prosecution and defense of RTNC's and Cook's compensable 
and noncompensable election phase claims required proof of what 
transpired during the election phase. * * * 
^r ^n ^r ^r *r P^ 
12. The vast majority of RTNC's litigation effort through trial was spent 
developing and presenting RTNC's claims for services rendered and 
expenses incurred during the election phase (i.e., its compensable breach of 
contract claim and its overlapping but noncompensable alternative unjust 
enrichment and other claims). 
* * * * * * 
15, Significant portions of both parties' litigation efforts were not claim-
specific (e.g., discovery and evidentiary motions, credibility, procedural 
matters and motions). 
21. RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs, 
including specifically Exhibit 1 thereto, accomplished these objectives. 
Specifically, it: 
* * * 
e. articulates a reasonable and rational basis for segregating 
and allocating RTNC's attorney fees between compensable and 
noncompensable claims; and, 
f. reasonably segregates and allocates RTNC's attorney fees 
between compensable and noncompensable claims. 
^h P^ *r ^r ^r P^ 
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22. Cook offers no evidence refuting RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit 
of Attorneys Fees and Costs, including but not limited to RTNC's 
evidence of: (i) the nature, reasonableness, and necessity of the work 
actually performed; (ii) the time expended by any member of RTNC's 
legal team on compensable and noncompensable claims; (iii) the factual 
overlap between compensable and noncompensable claims; (iv) the 
reasonableness of the fees sought; and (v) the consistency of the rates 
with those customarily charged for similar legal services in this area. 
* * * * * * 
26. Based upon RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of Attorneys Fees 
and Costs and the Court's personal familiarity with this complicated, 
high-profile, and hotly-contested litigation, the legal work performed by 
RTNC's counsel was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute this 
matter. In this vein, it is noted that the time spent by RTNC's counsel 
through trial and the fees sought by RTNC are, as evidenced by Cook's 
own fee application, comparable to the hours and fees of Cook's counsel 
through trial. 
[Addendum 4 (emphasis added)] 
* * * * * * 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE QUESTIONS WHETHER THE SERVICES AGREEMENT HAD 
BEEN MODIFIED AND WHETHER COOK BREACHED THE MODIFIED 
SERVICES AGREEMENT WERE PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE 
JURY AS ISSUES OF FACT. 
In his first argument on appeal, Cook asserts that the "legal question" 
whether the Services Agreement was orally modified should not have been submitted to 
the jury since the Services Agreement could not be orally modified as a matter of law. 
Cook then purports the jury did not find that Cook breached the written Services 
Agreement. Finally, Cook argues that RTNC's action should be dismissed because it did 
not submit the question of breach of a separate oral agreement to the jury. Cook's 
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arguments are entirely without merit for the following reasons: (1) Cook did not preserve 
the issue whether the Services Agreement could be orally modified as a matter of law for 
appeal because Cook did not adequately raise this issue with the trial court. (2) Utah law 
is well-settled that written agreements can be orally modified even if the written 
agreement contains a provision to the contrary. The question therefore was properly 
submitted to the jury. (3) Utah law also is well-settled that the question whether a written 
agreement was orally modified is a factual, not a legal, question. (4) Cook failed to 
marshal the evidence supporting the jury's findings that the written Services Agreement 
was modified and that the modified Services Agreement was breached were clearly 
erroneous. The jury's verdict and the trial court's judgment should therefore be affirmed. 
H. THE ATTORNEY FEES PROVISION CONTAINED IN THE MODIFIED 
SERVICES AGREEMENT FORMED A PROPER BASIS FOR THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ATTORNEY FEES AWARD TO RTNC. 
In his second argument, Cook repeats his argument that the Services 
Agreement could not be modified as a matter of law, again claims there was no finding 
that Cook breached the written agreement or any of its terms, and boldly asserts that 
"only Cook prevailed on any claims under the written agreement." Cook also argues that 
the attorney fees award was improper because Utah law does not allow attorney fees for a 
breach of an oral obligation. These allegations are contrary to law and are directly 
contradicted by the record on appeal. The jury did find that Cook breached his contract 
with the R.T. Nielson Co. "as modified." Further, Cook's construction of a modified 
agreement as consisting of the original agreement and the modifications as separate 
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entities is artificial, illogical, and not supported by Utah law. A "modification" of a 
contract is a change in one or more respects which introduces new elements into the 
details of the contract, cancels some of them, but leaves the general purpose and effect 
undisturbed. Under Utah law, the written attorney fees provision as contained in the 
modified Services Agreement applied to all provisions in that modified agreement 
regardless of whether such provisions were reduced to writing. RTNC brought this 
litigation to enforce provisions of the modified Services Agreement, prevailed in its quest, 
and is entitled to attorney fees under the Agreement. The trial court's award of attorney 
fees to RTNC should therefore be upheld. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES TO RTNC WAS A 
VALID EXERCISE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S BROAD DISCRETION. 
Cook's appeal from the trial court's attorney fees award to RTNC is not 
properly before the Court. Cook filed his only docketing statement in this matter in July 
2000 following entry of a nonfinal judgment. In January 2000, Cook appealed the trial 
court's only final judgment in this matter and moved to consolidate his two appeals. 
After acknowledging that the trial court had awarded RTNC attorney fees since his 
original docketing statement had been filed, Cook ratified his July 2000 docketing 
statement as being complete. That docketing statement did not identify the fee award to 
RTNC as an issue on appeal. Cook's failure to file a complete docketing statement at the 
appropriate time prejudiced RTNC by denying it (and this Court) from summarily 
disposing of issues raised by Cook. Cook's appeal regarding the fee award to RTNC 
should be dismissed. 
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RTNC was clearly the prevailing party in this matter and the only party 
entitled to recover attorney fees. Expressed in terms of the damages sought by both sides 
on compensable claims, RTNC prevailed on more than 95% of those claims. 
RTNC's fee application contained all evidence required by rule or case law 
and otherwise fully comported with applicable rules, case law, and the trial court's 
directives. RTNC was not required under Utah law or by the trial court to submit the 
additional evidence demanded by Cook. The trial court's decision not to request such 
information, even if desirable, was within its broad discretion or was harmless error. Nor 
was RTNC's fee award confined to its fee agreement with counsel. 
Cook's appeal of the fee award to RTNC challenges express findings of fact 
by the trial court. On appeal, Cook seeks to apply an 'abuse of discretion' standard to 
these findings, when the correct appellate standard of review is a 'clearly erroneous' 
standard. Cook fails to meet his burden under this latter standard by, inter alia, failing to 
marshal the evidence supporting these findings and failing to demonstrate, based on this 
evidence, that the trial court clearly erred in making its findings. 
The trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law re Attorneys 
Fees and Order Re Attorneys Fees are firmly grounded in the evidence submitted and in 
the law. As such, the trial court did not clearly err in its factual findings, did not err in its 
interpretation of applicable law, and did not abuse its broad discretion in awarding 
attorney fees to RTNC. 
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IV. COOK WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER HIS ATTORNEY FEES. 
The basis for awarding attorney fees was the parties' Modified Services 
Agreement, which provided for recovery of fees to the prevailing party. RTNC was the 
prevailing party in this litigation. In terms of damages or set-offs sought by both parties, 
RTNC prevailed on 96% of the parties compensable claims, with the remaining 4% 
coming as a set-off against RTNC's $194,000 verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE QUESTIONS WHETHER THE SERVICES AGREEMENT HAD 
BEEN MODIFIED AND WHETHER COOK BREACHED THE MODIFIED 
AGREEMENT WERE PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AS 
ISSUES OF FACT. 
A. Cook's Argument That No Cause of Action Exists in this Case for 
Breach of an Oral Modification to a Contract Is Not Reviewable by this 
Court. 
On appeal, Cook argues for the first time that the services agreement could 
not be modified as a matter of law since the Services Agreement included a clause that 
the contract could only be modified in writing. [Cook Brief pp. 1, 13, 15-25] Contrary to 
Cook's assertions, Cook did not preserve this issue in the court below. Failure to raise an 
issue below precludes its consideration on appeal. See Ong Inf 1 (U.S.A.! Inc. v. 11th 
Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993) (quotations omitted). 
The issue presented on appeal by Cook was never orally presented to the 
trial court, and the only place where this issue was even mentioned in the pleadings is the 
Fourteenth Defense in his Answer and Counterclaim: "Any alleged oral contract between 
plaintiff and defendants is void pursuant to paragraph 15 of the Services Agreement." 
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[R. 73 J1 However, "the mere mention of an issue in the pleadings . . . is insufficient to 
raise an issue at trial and thus insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal." LeBaron & 
Assocs. v. Rebel Enterpr. Inc., 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Cook never filed 
a dispositive motion based thereon, nor presented this argument verbally in the trial 
court.2 Cook's argument that no cause of action exists in this case for breach of an orally 
modified contract must be rejected and the trial court's judgment against Cook must be 
affirmed. Accord, West One Bank, Utah v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 887 P.2d 880, 882 
n. 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (refusing to consider waiver and estoppel argument even though 
raised as affirmative defense in Answer); see also James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
1
 None of the remaining citations Cook provides in support of his argument 
that this issue was preserved below are on point. [Cook Brief p. 1] R. 2494 pp. 83-84, 
contains questions asked by counsel to a member of the jury venire on polling. R 2028-
2040 contains Cook's Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees, Objection to RTNC's Motion 
for Costs and Attorney Fees, and Request for Hearing with Substitute Counsel as well as 
an Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit of attorney L. Deland in Support of Motion for 
Attorney Fees. R 2232-2242, in turn, contains Cook's Memorandum in Opposition to 
RTNC's Application for Attorney's Fees. Finally, R. 2450-2460 contains Cook's 
Objection to RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs. All but one 
of these arguments were raised after trial and all are inapposite. 
2
 At the trial court level, Cook instead argued that no (sufficient) evidence 
existed that Cook had agreed to any oral modifications to the services agreement. [See, 
e.g. R. 2503 pp. 44-45] 
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B. Cook Cannot Complain of Jury Instructions and Special Verdict Form 
That His Counsel Helped Create and To Which He Acquiesced. 
Similarly, Cook asserts for the first time on appeal that the first question 
contained in the Special Verdict form, "[d]id the RTNC and Merrill Cook and the Merrill 
Cook for Congress Committee modify their Services Agreement as alleged by the R.T. 
Nielson Co.?," [R. 1941] should not have been submitted to the jury. [Cook Brief p. 22] 
However, counsel for Cook took part in the drafting of the Special Verdict form and did 
not object to this Special Verdict form at trial. [R. 2502 at pp. 134-140; R. 2503 at pp. 3-
4, 81-93] "A district court will not be put in error for a ruling or procedure in which the 
appellant acquiesced or participated, or to which the appellant made no objection." State 
ex. Rel. State Comp. Mut. Ins. Fund v. Berg. 927 P.2d 975, 983 (Mont. 1996). Cook "is 
in no position to complain because [he] affirmatively participated in formulating 
instructions - and a verdict form[.]" See Fogg v .National R.R. Passenger Corp., 585 
A.2d 786, 790 n.6 (D.C. 1991). 
Moreover, in his argument on appeal, Cook ignores the fact that the issue of 
oral modifications to a written agreement was addressed extensively in the juiy 
instructions in this case. [R. 1968-2015.] Specifically, Jury Instruction No. 22 provided: 
FORM OF CONTRACT 
A contract or modification of a contract may be written or oral. 
[Addendum 1;R. 1990] 
In addition, Jury Instruction No. 24 provided: 
ORAL MODIFICATION OF WRITTEN CONTRACT 
-16-
Parties to a written contract are free to modify that contract by oral or 
verbal agreement, even though the written contract may prohibit oral or 
verbal modifications or require that modifications be in writing. 
[Addendum 1; R. 1992] 
Cook's counsel participated in the drafting of these jury instructions, and at 
trial did not object to any of these instructions, let alone the instructions on the issue of 
oral modifications. "'Having approved the instructions as given and requested no others, 
counsel should not be heard to complain that the court did not constitute itself counsel in 
the cause, and submit other theories not urged by defendant just because the court may 
think such theories of defense could have been urged/" State v. Peterson, 121 Utah 229, 
240 P.2d 504, 507 (1952) (quoting State v. Dubois, 98 Utah 234, 98 P.2d 354, 360 
(1940)).3 "No principle of law is better settled than the rule that a litigant cannot sit 
quietly by and chance a favorable verdict and thereafter assert error when he has helped 
to create the error or nurtured it by his silence." McGuire v. W.A. Thompson Distrib. 
Co., 30 Cal. Rptr.113, 121 (Cal. Ct. App.1963). Cook's objection to the special verdict 
form asserted for the first time on appeal should therefore be dismissed outright. 
C. The Law in Utah Is Well-settled That a Written Contract Can Be 
Orally Modified Even If the Contract Itself Contains a Provision to the 
Contrary, 
3
 Only where the "instructions are palpably erroneous to such an extent that 
they would, if followed by the jury, prevent a fair or proper determination of the issues" 
could an issue possibly be deemed preserved for appeal without an objection below. See 
id. This situation clearly is not present here. All instructions given to the jury, 
specifically on the issue of oral modifications to written agreements, were in accordance 
with Utah law as was the special verdict form. See infra, at pp. 19-22. 
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Even if this Court decides to consider Cook's argument that the issue of 
whether the Services Agreement was orally modified should never have been submitted to 
the jury, this Court should dismiss this argument as contrary to well-established Utah law. 
Contrary to Cook's representation to this Court that the question of whether a contract 
can be orally modified in the face of a contractual provision to the contrary is an issue of 
first impression in Utah,4 this Court as early as 1960 recognized that "[i]t is a well-
established rule of law that parties to a written contract may modify, waive, or make 
new terms notwithstanding terms in the contract designed to hamper such freedom." 
Davis v. Pavne & Day, Inc.. 10 Utah 2d 53, 348 P.2d 337, 339 (1960) (citing Salzner v. 
Jos. J. Snell Estate Corp.. 81 Utah 111, 16 P.2d 923, 925 (1932)). 
In subsequent decisions, this Court has clearly indicated its unwavering 
adherence to this principle. See e.g., Prince v. R.C. Tolman Const. Co. Inc.. 610 P.2d 
1267 (Utah 1980). In Prince. Prince brought suit for money owed based upon an oral 
modification. Id. Tolman countered citing a clause in their written agreement which 
stated that "any changes or modifications shall be in writing." Id Recognizing the 
validity of the oral modification claim, this Court stated: 
The first is the fundamental rule of review that it was the trial court's 
prerogative to judge the credibility of the evidence and to find the facts ... 
The second is the well-recognized rule that notwithstanding recitals in a 
prior contract restricting changes or modification in its terms, the parties are 
4
 See Cook's Docketing Statement at p. 6: "This appeal... involves several 
issues of first impression. Among these issues is the ability of the parties to orally 
modify a written contract containing an express provision prohibiting oral modifications 
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as free in appropriate circumstances to renegotiate new terms or to make 
separate supplemental agreements as they were to make the contract in the 
first place. 
Id. at 1269 (citations omitted). 
More recently, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld a trial court's sua sponte 
determination that a written contract had been orally modified. See Fisher v. Fishen 907 
P.2d 1172, 1176-1179 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Therefore, the law in Utah is well-settled 
that a written contract can in proper circumstances be orally modified even if the contract 
itself contains a provision to the contrary. Far from being an issue of first impression, 
this principle is black letter law in the State of Utah. 
Further, no good policy or other reasons exist to change the law on this 
point and abandon such a well-settled principle of law. First, Cook's invocation of the 
freedom to contract principle in support of his argument, [Cook Brief pp. 15-17] actually 
supports the rule as it exists in Utah. "It is fundamental that where parties have rights 
under an existing contract they have exactly the same power to renegotiate terms or to 
waive such rights as they had to make the contract in the first place .. . notwithstanding 
terms in that contract designed to hamper such freedom." Cheney v. Rucker. 14 Utah 2d 
205, 381 P.2d 86, 89 (1963) (citations and quotations omitted). 
Second, Cook's argument that oral modifications to a written agreement 
proscribing oral modifications should not be allowed because parties should be held to 
their agreements, [Cook Brief pp. 17, 23] fails. "There is nothing so sacrosanct about 
having entered into one agreement that it will prevent the parties entering into any such 
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change, modification, extension or addition to their arrangement for doing business with 
each other that they may mutually agree." PLC Landscape Const, v. Piccadilly Fish CN 
Chips, Inc.. 28 Utah 2d 350, 502 P.2d 562, 563 (1972) (citing Davis. 348 P.2d at 340; 
Chenev. 381 P.2d at 89 (1972)).5 
Finally, contract modifications, written or oral, "are governed by the same 
rules as to proof and enforceability as the original agreement."6 PLC Landscape Const.. 
502 P.2d at 563. "A valid modification of a contract.. . requires ca meeting of the minds 
of the parties, which must be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient 
definiteness.'" Colonial Pacific Leasing Corp. v. J.W.C.J.R.. 1999 UT App. 91, [^26, 977 
P.2d 541 (quoting Richard Barton Enterprises. Inc. v. Tsern. 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 
1996)). Therefore, Cook's argument for rigidly enforcing provisions such as paragraph 
15 of the Services Agreement in the face of an oral modification fails. 
D. Whether the Services Agreement Was Modified Is a Question of Fact. 
Cook's argument that the question whether the services agreement at issue was 
modified is a "legal question," [Cook Brief pp. 22-23] is without any basis. Utah case law 
clearly provides that "[t]he question of whether an 'oral modification has been proven is 
one for the trier of fact.'" Colonial Pacific Leasing Corp.. 1999 UT App. at [^27 
(quoting Dennett v. Kuenzli. 936 P.2d 219, 224 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997); Fair v. Red Lion 
5
 Ironically, the reason claims for oral modifications to written agreements 
are enforced in the face of provisions to the contrary is to prevent one party from securing 
performance under the modification only to escape his counter obligations by claiming 
lack of formalities. 
6
 Cook's implication to the contrary [Cook Brief p. 23] is faulty. 
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Inn, 920 P.2d 820, 825 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) aff'd, 943 P.2d 431 (Colo. 1997); Wollin v. 
Walker. 830 P.2d 429, 432 (Wyo. 1992)) (emphasis added). Consequently, Cook's 
argument must be dismissed as a failed effort to transpose a factual question into a 
purported legal question.7 
E. The Jury Properly Found That the Services Agreement Had Been 
Modified and That Cook Had Breached the Modified Agreement. 
Rather than addressing the evidence and the jury's findings in this case 
head-on, Cook posits on appeal that the written Services Agreement in his case could not 
be modified as a matter of law and that the jury was not asked whether the parries entered 
into separate, independent oral agreements. [Cook Brief p. 23] Cook then misinterprets 
the jury's findings by arguing that the jury (1) did not find that Cook breached the written 
Services Agreement, and (2) did not find that a separate oral agreement existed between 
Cook and RTNC. [Cook Brief pp. 1-2, 10, 13-14, 20, 23-24] Consequently, Cook 
asserts that this Court should dismiss RTNC's claims since it was RTNC's decision not to 
submit the question whether an independent oral agreement existed to the jury. [Cook 
Brief pp. 24-25] 
7
 The cases cited by Cook in support of his argument [Cook Brief p. 22] are 
wholly inapposite. See Gough v. Rossmoor Corp.. 487 F.2d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1973) and 
Wirtz v. LaFitte. 326 F.2d 856, 859 (5th Cir. 1964) where facts were undisputed and legal 
question submitted to jury. Here, the facts were far from undisputed. The entire dispute 
turned upon whether the Services Agreement had been modified and whether Cook 
breached the agreement as modified. The jury answered both these factual questions in 
the affirmative. [Addendum 2; R. 1941-1942] 
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Cook's argument is entirely without merit. First, as discussed supra, the 
premise for Cook's line of reasoning, i.e., that the Services Agreement could not be 
modified as a matter of law is contrary to Utah law. Second, "[i]t is settled that 'the 
parties to a contract' may modify 'all or any portion of that contract.'" Fisher, 907 P.2d 
at 1177 (quoting Western Sur. Co. v. Murphy. 754 P.2d 1237, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988)) (emphasis added); see also Rapp v. Mountain States Tel & Tel. Co.. 606 P.2d 
1189, 1191 (Utah 1980). "A modification of a contract is a change in one or more 
respects which introduces new elements into the details of the contract, cancels some 
of them, but leaves the general purpose and effect undisturbed," Chicago College of 
Osteopathic Medicine v. George A. Fuller Co.. 776 F.2d 198, 208 (7th Cir. 1985) (citation 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
In Fisher, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's sua sponte 
finding "that the parties narrowly modified the original escrow agreement" as to when 
annual payments were due under the agreement, reasoning that "[t]he remaining terms 
of the parties' agreement... remained governed by the original written escrow 
agreement." Fisher. 907 P.2d at 1177. (emphasis added). 
Here, the jury found that the services agreement had been orally modified, 
and found that Cook breached the Services Agreement "as modified." [Addendum 2; 
R. 2503 p. 87; R. 1941-1942]8 These findings are in accordance with Utah law, and are 
The trial court shared this view of the jury's verdict [Findings at f 17] 
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based on ample evidence.9 Under Utah law, this modified contract consisted of the 
original written Services Agreement, which remained in effect, as well as certain new 
elements which were introduced into the written Services Agreement through oral 
modifications.10 Accordingly, Cook's argument that he was not found to have breached 
the Service Agreement and that the jury did not find any additional agreement between 
the parties is baseless. 
F. Cook in Any Event Waived His Right to Insist on Strict Compliance 
with the Requirement That Modifications Only Be in Writing. 
In this case, Cook has waived his right to insist upon strict compliance with 
the provision requiring that any modification of that agreement be in writing. [Exh. 17P, 
at U 15] Further, Cook is estopped from asserting any statute of frauds argument.11 Ample 
9
 E.g., Trial Exhibit 153P [Addendum 3] provided "an outline from the time 
[RTNC] started invoicing [Cook] until the end of the convention [and providing] a 
running balance." [R. 2495 p. 94,11. 23-24, p. 95,1. 1]. Exhibit 153P included invoice 
number 96118 in the amount of $40,000.00, the fee included in the original written 
Services Agreement. [R. 2495 p. 95,11. 13-16; Exh. 17P, at \ 4(b)]. Of this amount 
included in the original Services Agreement, $2,086.00 remained unpaid. [R. 2495 p. 96, 
11. 8-13, 18-20]. In addition, Exhibit 153P evidences moneys owed to RTNC based on 
services rendered pursuant to the Modified Services Agreement. [R. 2495 pp. 161,1. 23 -
p. 164,1. 25]. 
10
 These modifications are described in more detail in Jury Instruction No. 40. 
[R. 2009-2010] 
11
 Cook makes passing reference to § 70A-2-209 of the Utah Code Ann. 
[Cook Brief p. 20]. However, Utah's version of the Uniform Commercial Code does not 
apply to this case since this case involves a contract for services, not for sale of "goods." 
Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-105(1) Furthermore, even if this statutory section would apply, 
"Utah Code Ann. section 70A-2-209(4)... provides that an oral attempt to modify a 
contract can operate as a waiver of section 209(2) 's requirement of written modification." 
Lake Philgas Service v. Valley Bank & Trust Co.. 845 P.2d 951, 957 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (citing Durbano Metals. Inc. v. A & K R.R. Materials, Inc.. 574 P.2d 1159, 1162 
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evidence exists in the record that RTNC changed its position by executing its 
performance of the Services Agreement as orally modified and, in fact, performed the 
Modified Services Agreement in its entirety with Cook's knowledge and acquiescence. 
[E.g., Trial Exhibit 153; Addendum 3] 
[A] recognized and accepted exception to the statute of frauds provides[:] 
* * * 
[W]here there is evidence of part performance under the modified 
agreement, and where it would be inequitable to permit a party to repudiate 
the oral modification and seek enforcement of the written contract, the oral 
agreement may be removed from the statute of frauds and enforced. 
Fisher, 907 P.2d at 117712; see also White v. Fox, 665 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1983) ("[i]f 
a party has changed his position by performing an oral modification so that it would be 
inequitable to permit the other party to found a claim upon the original agreement... the 
modified agreement should be held valid") (quotation omitted). Consequently, Cook is 
barred by the doctrines of waiver and estoppel from insisting on appeal that any 
modifications of the Services Agreement be in writing. Accord, Tolman, 610 P.2d at 
1269; Lone Mountain Production Co. v. National Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 984 F.2d 
1551, 1557 (10th Cir. 1992). 
(Utah 1978)). 
12
 The Utah Court of Appeals further stated: "we note that just as a partial 
modification of a written contract that is likewise in writing is enforceable, so is an oral 
modification that the parties clearly relied upon and that one party performed in part." 
Fisher, 907 P.2d at 1177 n.5. 
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G. Assuming Arguendo that Utah Law Does Not Recognize RTNC's 
Breach of Modified Contract Claims, RTNC Asserted Alternative 
Claims Requiring Trial on Remand. 
Cook argues that RTNC has no viable claims against Cook because: (i) 
Utah law does not recognize the breach of oral modification claims upon which Cook 
claims RTNC obtained a verdict and; (ii) RTNC submitted no other claims to the jury. 
[Cook Brief at pp. 24-25]13 Based upon these assumptions, Cook argues that the jury 
verdict in favor of RTNC should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of Cook, no 
cause of action. This argument fails. RTNC's breach of modified contract theory was 
not the only theory submitted to the jury regarding RTNC's election phase services. 
RTNC also submitted its claims for these services to the jury under an unjust enrichment 
theory. [Addendum 1; R. 1942 % 5] 
Thus, even if Cook's assertion that RTNC's contract-based claims are 
barred is correct, RTNC still has its alternative claim for unjust enrichment. Appellate 
courts may affirm the trial court on any basis, including arguments not relied on by the 
trial court. Levitz v. Warrington, 877 P.2d 1245, 1249 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(citations omitted). The judgment of the trial court enforcing the jury's verdict must be 
affirmed. 
13
 While Cook does not say so, it is clear that this argument is directed solely 
at RTNC's claims for election phase services, as the only RTNC claim for post-election 
services submitted to the jury was for unjust enrichment. 
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H. THE ATTORNEY FEES PROVISION CONTAINED IN THE MODIFIED 
SERVICES AGREEMENT FORMED A PROPER BASIS FOR THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ATTORNEY FEES AWARD TO RTNC. 
A. The Attorney Fees Award Was Proper Pursuant to the Modified 
Services Agreement. 
In arguing that the $195,800.93 attorney fees award to RTNC was 
improper, Cook repeats his invalid argument that the Services Agreement could not be 
modified as a matter of law [Cook Brief p. 25] and misrepresents the jury's findings by 
claiming that "there was no finding that Cook breached the written agreement or any of 
its terms." [Cook Brief p. 29; see also id, pp. 4, 14, 20, 23-24, 25] These assertions, as 
well as Cook's allegation that "only Cook prevailed on any claims under the written 
agreement," [Cook Brief pp. 1-2] are directly contradicted by the record on appeal.14 As 
already discussed supra at p. 23, the jury found that "Cook breach[ed ] their contract with 
the R.T. Nielson Co. as modified." [R. 1942 (emphasis added)] The attorney fees 
provision contained in the Modified Services Agreement provides: 
Attorney Fees. The prevailing party to any litigation brought to enforce 
any provision of this agreement shall be awarded its costs and attorney 
fees. 
[Services Agreement, Exhibit 17P, at 1f 14 (emphasis added)] 
14
 The record does contain evidence that Cook violated the original written 
Service Agreement. Exhibit 153P [Addendum 3] included invoice number 96118 in the 
amount of $40,000.00, the fee included in the original written Services Agreement. 
[R. 2495 p. 95,11. 13-16; Exh. 17P, at f 4(b)]. Of this amount included in the original 
Services Agreement, $2,086.00 remained unpaid. [R. 2495 p. 96,11. 8-13, 18-20] This 
unpaid balance was part of RTNC s successful breach of contract claims in this action. 
See id. 
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RTNC brought this litigation to enforce provisions of the Modified Services 
Agreement, prevailed in its quest, and is entitled to attorney fees under the Agreement. 
B. The Attorney Fees Award Was Proper under Utah Law. 
Cook next argues that the attorney fees award was improper because Utah 
law does not allow attorney fees for a breach of an oral obligation. [Cook Brief p. 28] 
However, Cook's construction of a modified agreement as consisting of the original 
agreement and the modifications as separate entities is artificial, illogical, and not 
supported by Utah law.15 In Lemley v. Allen. 659 P.2d 262 (Mont. 1983), the trial court 
found "that the parties had orally modified the original lease [agreement]... by an 
executed oral agreement." Id. at 265. Based on these findings, the Montana Supreme 
Court concluded that "[t]herefore the original lease was modified (but still in effect)." 
Id. (emphasis added). As in our case, the appellant in Lemley challenged the trial court's 
award of attorney fees as not warranted by the attorney fees provision contained in the 
original written agreement. However, the Montana Supreme Court found this challenge 
to be "totally without merit," reasoning: "A request for attorney fees was contained in 
[appellee's] answer. [Appellee] prevailed in her defense. Obviously, the award of fees 
was proper." Id. (emphasis added). Utah case law clearly supports the proposition that 
15
 It is settled that the parties to a contract may modify all or any portion of 
that contract. A "modification" of a contract is a change in one or more respects which 
introduces new elements into the details of the contract, cancels some of them, but leaves 
the general purpose and effect undisturbed. See supra, p. 24. 
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an attorney fees provision contained in the Modified Services Agreement forms a proper 
basis for the trial court's attorney fees award to RTNC. See Fisher, 907 P.2d at 1177. 
Cook cites Section 78-27-56.5 of the Utah Code Annotated in support of his 
strained argument that the contractual provision that is breached must be contained in a 
written contract before attorney fees can be awarded. [Cook Brief p. 28] However, 
Section 78-27-56.5 provides that "[a] court may award costs and attorney's fees to either 
party that prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or 
other writing[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (1986). RTNC brought its action based 
on the Modified Services Agreement, prevailed, and is entitled to attorney fees under the 
attorney fees provision contained in the original written Services Agreement.16 
Thus, under Utah law, the attorney fees provision as contained in the 
written Services Agreement, as orally modified, applied to all provisions in that modified 
agreement regardless of whether such provisions were reduced to writing. See generally 
Fisher, 907 P.2d at 1177-1179. Cook's violations of the Modified Services Agreement 
clearly entitled RTNC to an award of attorney fees under Utah law and the trial court's 
award of attorney fees to RTNC as the prevailing party should therefore be upheld. In 
addition, RTNC respectfully requests this Court to grant additional attorney fees to 
16
 Petersen v. Hodges. 121 Utah 72, 239 P.2d 180 (1951), which Cook argues 
is "strikingly similar" to the present action," [Cook Brief p. 28] is not at all comparable 
and in any event does not support Cook's construction of Utah law. While the court 
declined to impose attorney fees, Petersen involved a written lease agreement pertaining 
to one parcel of land and a separate and distinct oral lease agreement pertaining to a 
different parcel. Id. at 181. Moreover, the parties were found to have rescinded the oral 
lease agreement. Id. at 182. 
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RTNC for fees incurred in defending this appeal before this Court based upon the same 
attorney fees provision included in the Modified Services Agreement. Accord 
Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 408-409 (Utah 
1980). 
III. COOK'S CHALLENGE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FEE AWARD TO 
RTNC IS WITHOUT MERIT. 
A. Cook's Appeal of the Fee Award Is Not Properly Before the Court And 
Must Be Dismissed. 
Cook's appeal of the trial court's award of RTNC's attorney fees is barred 
by reason of Cook's failure to include this issue in his docketing statement. Rule 
9(c)(2)(C)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure required Cook to list in his 
docketing statement "[t]he issues presented by the appeal, expressed in the terms and 
circumstances of the case " Utah R. App. P. 9(c)(2)(C)(5). Docketing statements 
must fully comply with Rule 9 and, if they do not, the appeal or affected portion thereof 
may be dismissed. Brooks v. Department of Employment Sec.» 736 P.2d 241, 241 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987) (per curiam). 
Cook's docketing statement was filed following the trial court's May 31, 
2000 entry of anonfinal interim judgment in favor of RTNC for principal and interest 
only, [R. 2226-2228] As the judgment was not final, no appeal could be taken from it. 
See A.J. Mackav Co. v. Okland Construction Co., 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991). 
Because Cook had no right of appeal when he filed his docketing statement in July 2000, 
the docketing statement did not trigger RTNC's right to seek summary disposition as 
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contemplated by Rule 10. For this reason, RTNC did not seek summary disposition of 
any of the issues listed in Cook's docketing statement. 
Cook's docketing statement listed seven issues for appeal. The award of 
attorney fees to RTNC was not among the issues listed. At this juncture, the trial court 
had ruled that RTNC was the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorney fees, but 
had not awarded any fees to RTNC. 
The non-final judgment from which Cook initially appealed was 
subsequently vacated by the trial court. [R. 2356-2357] The trial court thereafter entered 
final Judgment in favor of RTNC on December 22, 2000. [No Record Reference] On 
January 5, 2001, Cook filed a Notice of Appeal as to this judgment. [Id] He did not 
however, file a docketing statement as to this, his only proper appeal. Instead, he filed a 
Motion for Consolidation of Appeals and, after specifically noting that the only material 
difference between the trial court's interim and final judgments was the award of attorney 
fees to RTNC, ratified his original docketing statement: 
[T]his appeal began last June, the lower court's December 20, 2000, 
judgment is similar to the earlier judgment from which the appeal was 
taken, and the docketing statement and other preparatory action have 
been completed. 
[Id] By this ratification, Cook represented to this Court and RTNC that the only issues 
to be presented on the appeal were those listed in the docketing statement. 
Cook's failure to timely and properly file a docketing statement in 
compliance with Rule 9 has prejudiced RTNC. One of the express purposes of a 
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docketing statement is use by the appellate court "in making summary dispositions when 
appropriate . . . ." Utah R. App. P. 9(b). In order for this purpose to be fulfilled, issues 
which may be appropriate for summary disposition must be identified for the appellate 
court by the appellee through a motion for summary disposition. In order for the appellee 
to do this, all issues presented by the appeal must be identified in the docketing statement. 
Absent a properly filed docketing statement that triggers its right to seek summary 
disposition, the appellee is not required to consider let alone file a motion for summary 
disposition. 
Had Cook filed a docketing statement as required by Rule 9, RTNC would 
have sought summary disposition as to all of Points 1, 2, and/or 4 of Cook's Arguments 
on appeal. As demonstrated, infra, summary disposition was warranted on some or all of 
these issues. 
Cook's appeal regarding the RTNC attorney fees award must therefore be 
dismissed, lest Cook benefit twice from his failure to comply with Rule 9; to wit: first by 
denying RTNC an opportunity to seek summary disposition of issues contained in an 
improperly filed docketing statement, and second, presenting issues on appeal not listed 
in any docketing statement. 
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B. Cook's Evidentiary Challenges to the Fee Award Are Without Merit. 
1. RTNC Was Not Required To Prove that the Fees It Seeks Were 
Incurred, Owed, or Paid, or to Provide "Contemporaneous Billing 
Information. 
Cook contends that the trial court was required to have RTNC put on 
evidence that the attorney fees RTNC was seeking were actually incurred, paid, or are 
owed. [Cook Brief pp. 33-34] Utah law does not impose such a requirement. Cf, 
Softsolutions. Inc. v. Brigham Young University. 2000 UT 46, % 47-56, 1 P.3d 1095; 
Jones. Waldo. Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson. 923 P.2d 1366, 1375 (Utah 1996); 
Smith v. Batchelor. 832 P.2d 467, 473 (Utah 1992).17 
Cook cites Softsolutions for the general proposition that "[an] award of fees 
[is] limited to [the] amount actually paid or for which [the prevailing] party is obligated." 
[Cook Brief p. 33] This proposition can not be found in Softsolutions. In Softsolutions. 
the prevailing party (B YU) had been represented in litigation by in-house counsel and 
was seeking recovery of its attorney fees. Isolating these specific circumstances, this 
Court said that "[f]ees for in-house counsel are limited to consideration actually paid or 
for which the party is obligated . . . ." Softsolutions. 2000 UT 46 at ^ [52 (emphasis 
17
 Cook also cites these cases for the proposition that if RTNC has a 
contingent fee agreement with its counsel, RTNC's fee recovery "would be limited to that 
contingency." [Cook Brief p. 34, n.8] This interpretation of these cases is imaginative at 
best, as none of these case dealt with a contingent fee arrangement. Further, as 
demonstrated, infra, the fee arrangement between the prevailing party and its counsel 
may, but need not, be considered in making a fee award and is in any event not 
determinative. 
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added). Here, RTNC was not represented by in-house counsel and Softsolutions is 
inapposite. 
Cook cites Jones Waldo for the general proposition that "[there can be] no 
award of fees where the party seeking fees did not actually pay or become liable for legal 
representation and thus did not incur attorney's fees." [Cook Brief p. 33] This 
proposition cannot be found in Jones Waldo. In Jones Waldo, a law firm had 
successfully represented itself in a fee dispute where the fee agreement provided for 
attorney fees to the prevailing party. In affirming the trial court's rejection of the law 
firm's fee application, this Court held that "plaintiff was not entitled to attorney fees in its 
pro se collection action" against its client. See Jones Waldo. 923 P.2d at 1375. Here, 
RTNC was not representing itself pro se and Jones Waldo is inapposite. 
Cook cites Batchelor for the same proposition as Jones Waldo. [Cook Brief 
p. 33] Batchelor presented a situation materially identical to Jones Waldo, with the only 
difference being that the pro se litigant in Batchelor was an attorney seeking to recover 
attorney fees pursuant to statute. In affirming the trial court's rejection of the fee 
application, this Court stated that "[i]t is the general rule that pro se litigants should not 
recover attorney fees in successful litigation." Batchelor. 832 P.2d at 473. Again, RTNC 
was not a pro se litigant and Batchelor is inapposite. 
Simply stated, Cook has not cited and cannot cite any authority that 
requires a prevailing party represented by independent counsel to submit evidence that 
the fees sought have been incurred, paid, or are owed by that party. 
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Cook also claims that the trial court was required to have RTNC put 
"contemporaneous billing information" into evidence. [See Cook Brief pp. 31-40] Cook 
cites Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 1999 UT App 109, % 14-15 978 P.2d 470, cert. 
denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999) for this proposition. The role, if any, that the 
"contemporaneous billing records" played in Brown is unclear. What is clear is that these 
records were at best of secondary importance to the Court of Appeals: 
The evidence that Richards presented was sufficient to meet the allocation 
instructions we set on remand .... Richards, through his fee application, 
properly set out the time and fees expended for successful claims for 
which there was an entitlement to attorney fees. Richards went through 
all billing records and eliminated fees for all non-recoverable fees and 
articulated this process for the trial court in the evidentiary hearing. 
The substance of this process reached our desired result of separating 
recoverable from non-recoverable fees for consideration by the trial court.. 
Id. (emphasis added). In substance, RTNC did precisely what Richards did in Brown, to 
wit: (i) RTNC analyzed its counsel's billing records and eliminated from its fee claim that 
portion of its effort clearly or likely expended on noncompensable issues and; (ii) 
articulated in its fee application the process it followed to accomplish this segregation. 
Cook claims that RTNC has repeatedly failed to respond to "this issue" and 
that this supposed failure "speaks volumes" as to some unstated point. [Cook Brief p. 34] 
In fact, RTNC has responded to "this issue" every time and that response has been to 
decline Cook's demand for proof where neither Utah law nor the trial court required such 
proof. These are but two of the reasons the evidence sought by Cook was not submitted 
by RTNC. 
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A third reason that RTNC did not offer the evidence demanded by Cook, in 
particular the "contemporaneous" billing information, is that such information is 
irrelevant in light of the evidence that RTNC did produce, to wit: the sworn testimony of 
RTNC's counsel that, inter alia, he conducted a detailed review of the time charged 
against the Cook file in the context of the services provided on each phase of the 
litigation and the actual court records, deposition transcripts, trial transcripts, etc. 
[R. 2071-2077, 2381-2414, 2194-2196] This approach, which was mandated by the trial 
court, required RTNC to reorganize gross billing information into the categories 
requested by the trial court and, further, to show specifically where and to what extent 
RTNC's legal effort was allocated to compensable and noncompensable issues. Further 
evidence was unnecessary, particularly in view of Cook's failure to offer any 
controverting evidence on any aspect of RTNC's fee application and the evidence 
submitted of his own fees and costs.18 
Cook also claims that RTNC's fee claim is limited to whatever fee 
arrangement it has with counsel, implying that that fee arrangement must be put into 
evidence. [Cook Brief p. 34, n. 8] Cook is wrong. Under Utah Law, the fee arrangement 
between a prevailing party and its counsel is largely irrelevant to, and, at a minimum, is 
neither required nor determinative of, the fees to be awarded. See e.g., Canyon Country 
18
 Cook sought $195,000 in fees following trial while asserting that this 
amount did not fairly reflect fair compensation for his legal effort. [R. 2099-2190, 2033-
2040, 2106 at \ 15, 2035 at 1fs 6 and 7] 
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Store v. Bracey. 781 P.2d 414, 420 (Utah 1989) (contingency fee agreement not 
determinative of fee award where award based on contract or statute); Associated 
Industrial Developments, Inc. v. Jewkes. 701 P.2d 486, 488 (Utah 1984) (while evidence 
of fee agreement "may be helpful... it cannot substitute for trial court's full inquiry into 
the matter"). 
The reasons the evidence sought by Cook is not required are apparent. A 
prevailing party's fee arrangement with counsel generally should not inure either to the 
benefit or detriment of the losing party. Accordingly, the fee award to the prevailing 
party is driven by an objective, not subjective, standard (i.e., reasonably necessary 
services at market rates). See e.g., Canyon Country. 781 P.2d at 420. 
Having all required evidence before it and no controverting evidence from 
Cook, the trial court in its broad discretion awarded RTNC a portion of its attorney fees. 
This award must be affirmed, not set aside based upon nonexistent requirements. 
2. Cook's Challenge of the Trial Court's Finding that RTNC's Fees 
Were Reasonable and Necessary Fails Because Cook: (D Did Not 
Apply the Appropriate Standard of Appellate Review; and fii) Did 
Not Meet His Burden Under that or Any Other Applicable Standard. 
Cook claims that RTNC failed to establish that the legal effort for which it 
was awarded fees was reasonable and necessary. [Cook Brief pp. 35-36] He asks this 
Court to review this particular component of his appeal on an "abuse of discretion" 
standard [Cook Brief p. 3]. While it is true that Utah's appellate courts have generally 
stated that this standard is used to review a trial court's award of attorney fees on 
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appeal19, RTNC submits that Cook has mis-identified the issue he is appealing and, in the 
process, failed to meet his burden under the applicable standard. 
The vagaries of what appellate standards of review apply to the many 
decisions trial courts make every day have resulted in much discussion amongst judges, 
practitioners, and legal scholars. This debate has lead this Court to acknowledge that the 
appellate standard of review to be applied to a trial court's decision is a function of 
several factors, including but not limited to the specific issue the trial court is being asked 
to decide, the degree of discretion if any that the law vests in the trial court on that issue, 
and the nature of the attack on the decision; i.e., whether the issue turns upon the law, the 
facts, or both. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936-939 (Utah 1994). 
Pena therefore requires a closer examination of this particular component of 
Cook's appeal. Cook claims that "the only evidence submitted by RTNC's counsel [in 
support of the reasonableness and necessity of its legal effort]" consisted of statements 
from its fee affidavits affirming that its effort was, inter alia, reasonable and necessary. 
[Cook Brief p. 36] After acknowledging but not discussing still other evidence on the 
issue, Cook nakedly concludes that the evidence submitted by RTNC "made it impossible 
. . . [for anyone] to determine whether the fees were reasonable and whether they were 
necessary . .." [Cook Brief p. 36] 
19
 See e.g., Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Associates, 910 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996). 
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Simply stated, Cook is not attacking the trial court's fee award, but rather a 
the basis for that award, to wit: the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 
reasonableness and necessity of RTNC's legal effort. In view of the trial court's express 
finding that "the legal work performed by RTNC's counsel was reasonably necessary to 
adequately prosecute this matter," [Addendum 4; Findings at ^ 23] Cook's attack is on 
specific findings of the trial court. 
A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed on appeal under a "clearly 
erroneous" standard. In re Estate of Knickerbocker. 912 P.2d 969, 977-978 (Utah 1996); 
but see Selvage. 910 P.2d at 1257 (trial court's findings of fact re attorney fees award are 
questions of law reviewed for correctness). Under this standard, Cook is required to do 
two things: (i) marshal all of the evidence which supports the trial court's findings; and 
(ii) demonstrate that the trial court's findings are "clearly erroneous in light of the great 
weight of the evidence" or otherwise persuade the appellate court such that it is 
"definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made." Knickerbocker. 912 
P.2d at 977. 
Cook has failed to meet this burden in the following particulars: 
o Cook has ignored the trial court's finding that RTNC's legal effort was reasonably 
necessary to the case, as well as related findings which clearly bolster that finding, 
o Cook has failed to marshal the evidence in the record which supports the trial 
court's finding. The evidence ignored by Cook included, inter alia: (i) the 
evidence that the efforts of Cook's legal counsel which the trial court references 
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in the very finding of fact being challenged by Cook, were comparable to the 
efforts of RTNC s counsel [Addendum 4, Findings at If 23]; (ii) the general 
evidence of the effort of RTNC's counsel throughout the litigation [see e.g., R. 
2381-2414]; and (iii) the extensive discovery and dispositive motion practice that 
occurred during the case, most of which was necessitated by Cook and won by 
RTNC. [see e.g., R. 170-251,266-620, 1359-1384, 1388-1397, 1480-1496, 1535-
1675, 1678-1745].20 
o Cook has failed to demonstrate that the evidence he failed to marshal is against the 
great weight of evidence on the issue. To be sure, as Cook offered no evidence to 
controvert RTNC's proof, Cook could not make this showing. 
Based on the foregoing, one can not help but conclude that the trial court clearly did not 
err when it found RTNC's legal effort to be reasonable and necessary. Having failed to 
sustain his burden on this aspect of his appeal, Cook's appeal fails. 
Assuming arguendo that the appellate standard of review for all aspects of 
the RTNC fee award is an 'abuse of discretion' standard, Cook's argument still fails. As 
20
 Cook mischaracterizes Ex. 1 to RTNC's Supplemental Fee Affidavit as a 
mere "summary." Ex. 1 does reorganize and in the process summarize the myriad time 
entries of the legal personnel who worked on the case, but its also does much more. 
Specifically, as contemplated by applicable rule and case law and directed by the trial 
court, it: (i) allocates the efforts of 12 individuals to 11 specific aspects of the litigation; 
(ii) further allocates these efforts into more than 125 entries, each of which describes the 
work performed and hours spent on that work by that individual in that aspect of the 
litigation, and; (iii) provides an appropriate format to delineate where and to what extent 
these efforts were allocated to compensable and noncompensable issues. 
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found by the trial court, RTNC's fee application contains all evidence required under 
Utah law and, based upon this evidence and law, that RTNC was entitled to recover 
attorney fees. Having failed to conduct any meaningful analysis of the trial court's 
findings of fact, Cook has not demonstrated and can not demonstrate (as he must) that the 
trial court abused its discretion in making this award. Specifically, he has failed to 
demonstrate that the award "is without reasonable basis", Crookston v. Fire Insurance 
Exchange, 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993), or was "arbitrary and capricious", Kunzler v. 
O'DelL 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Measured against these standards, Cook's assertion that the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings made it "impossible" for anyone to determine 
whether RTNC's legal effort was reasonable or unnecessary rings hollow. Cook's two 
examples in support of this argument shed no light on his concerns: 
o The first example cited is 74.3 hours of time charged for the various discovery 
motions filed in the court below. Because specific dates are not given for this 
time, Cook argues that it is impossible to tie this time to any particular work or 
determine whether that work was reasonable and necessary. Perhaps Cook did not 
look hard enough. The record reveals that there were ten such motions filed in the 
court below, with RTNC prevailing on most of these motions, [see e.g., R. 170-
251,266-620, 1359-1384, 1388-1397, 1480-1496, 1535-1675, 1678-1745] 
Knowing the exact dates this work was performed adds nothing. 
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o The second example cited by Cook is the 60 or so hours for the Felt mediation. 
Were Cook's current attorney not his third attorney on the case, he would know 
that the Felt mediation took place before any discovery had been conducted and 
when both parties were "ramping-up" on the facts and law at issue. This, coupled 
with the drafting of a position paper, etc., readily explains the effort. Clearly, the 
dates this work was performed would bring nothing more to the mix. 
Finally, Cook takes issue with the trial court's award of fees to RTNC for 
the effort required to prove its attorney fees claim. This effort was of course necessary to 
prove RTNC's case for attorney fees (a basic component of its case against Cook) and 
was itself compensable under the contract. 
In sum, the trial court neither 'clearly erred' not 'abused its discretion' in 
finding RTNC's legal effort to be reasonable and necessary. For the above-stated 
reasons, the trial court's fee award to RTNC must be affirmed. 
3. Cook's Challenge of the Trial Court's Finding that RTNC 
Reasonably Allocated Its Fees to Compensable and Noncompensable 
Issues Fails Because Cook: (i) Did Not Apply the Appropriate 
Standard of Appellate Review: and (ii) Did Not Meet His Burden 
Under that or Any Other Applicable Standard. 
Cook's attack on the trial court's allocation of RTNC's legal effort to 
compensable and noncompensable issues21 [Cook Brief pp. 37-40] is also an appeal from 
21
"Compensable" issues are issues where attorney fees are recoverable under the 
parties' contract. "Noncompensable" issues are those where attorney fees are not 
compensable. 
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an express finding of fact by the trial court, to wit: that RTNC's fee application 
"reasonably segregates and allocates RTNC's attorney fees between compensable and 
noncompensable claims." [Addendum 4; Findings at ^  21] As discussed in the 
immediately preceding section, Cook applies the wrong standard of appellate review. 
Again, the appellate standard of review when attacking the trial court's findings of fact is 
the 'clearly erroneous' standard. In re Knickerbocker. 912 P.2d at 977-978. Cook again 
fails to apply or meet his burden under this standard: 
o Cook has ignored the trial court's express finding that RTNC's had reasonably 
allocated its legal effort between compensable and noncompensable claims, as 
well as related findings which support that finding. 
o Cook has failed to marshal the evidence in the record which supports the trial 
court's findings. The evidence ignored by Cook included, inter alia: (i) the 
prosecution and defense of both parties' compensable and noncompensable claims 
for election-phase services required proof of the same facts [R. 2385-2392]; (ii) 
the election-phase of this dispute encompassed at least 80% of the relevant time 
frame for the entire dispute and some 94% of each party's damage claims; (iii) 
RTNC allocated some 84% of its legal effort to compensable claims and some 
16% to noncompensable claims [R. 2393, 2395]; (iv) the vast majority of RTNC's 
legal effort was expended on its claims for election-phase services and defending 
Cook's counterclaims arising out of those same services and related billings [R 
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2391 at 111]; and (v) a substantial portion of RTNC's legal effort entailed efforts 
on issues that were not claim-specific, but nonetheless compensable [Id], 
o Cook failed to demonstrate that the evidence he failed to marshal is against the 
great weight of evidence regarding allocation. As he offered no evidence 
controverting RTNC's allocation of its effort, Cook could not make this showing. 
Once again, one cannot help but conclude that the trial court clearly did not err when it 
accepted RTNC's allocation of legal effort between compensable and noncompensable 
claims. Having failed to sustain his burden on this aspect of his appeal, Cook's appeal 
fails. 
Against this backdrop, Cook's attack on the results of the trial court's 
allocation fails even under an 'abuse of discretion' standard. As found by the trial court, 
RTNC's fee application contains all evidence required under Utah law and, based upon 
this evidence and law, the trial court awarded RTNC its attorney fees. Having failed to 
conduct any meaningful analysis of the trial court's findings of fact, Cook has not 
demonstrated and can not demonstrate (as he must) that the trial court abused its 
discretion in making this award. Specifically, he has failed to demonstrate that the award 
"is without reasonable basis", Crookston. 860 P.2d at 938, or was "arbitrary and 
capricious", Kunzler. 855 P.2d at 275. For example: 
o As demonstrated in Brown, the appellate court's concern is the process used to 
make this allocation, not the results; yet Cook complains only of the results, 
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arguing that it is somehow evidence of a defective process. As demonstrated infra, 
the process used to structure RTNC's fee application was substantively identical to 
the process used in Brown, except that RTNC also analyzed its entire legal effort 
in the context of what actually transpired in the court below. Having not analyzed 
the process, Cook can not credibly argue that the process and resulting award has 
no reasonable basis or are arbitrary and capricious. 
Cook claims that the lack of "contemporaneous billing records showing the dates, 
the specific descriptions of the work performed, and the time spent on a particular 
task made it impossible" for anyone to analyze what fees were attributable to 
compensable claims. [Cook Brief pp. 37-38] As previously demonstrated, such 
evidence is not required under Utah law. See Argument III.B. 1. Further, Cook 
does not explain why the lack of such information removes any reasonable basis 
for the fee award or renders the award arbitrary and capricious. 
Cook implies that RTNC is not entitled to recover fees for its successful defense of 
the vast majority of Cook's breach of contract counterclaims. [Cook Brief p.39] 
The parties' contract allows "[t]he prevailing party" to recover fees for breach of 
contract claims. As RTNC prevailed on the vast majority of Cook's breach of 
contract claims, RTNC was the prevailing party on those claims and is entitled to 
recover its fees for that effort from Cook. 
Cook argues that RTNC prevailed only on one of its nine claims, implying that it 
is therefore only entitled to recover 1/9 or some comparable portion of its fees. 
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[Cook Brief p. 39] This argument fails because (i) the one claim for election-phase 
services that RTNC prevailed on was its claim that Cook breached the modified 
Services Agreement, a compensable claim; (ii) the trial court expressly found that 
the factual basis for both parties' compensable claims for election phase services 
was the same; and (iii) RTNC prevailed on more than 96% of these compensable 
damage claims.22 
o Cook claims that RTNC's allocations do not make sense and are arbitrary because 
the percentage allocations between compensable and noncompensable issues vary 
from entry-to-entry and phase-to-phase. [Cook Brief p. 39] Had he made any 
effort to analyze and address the process used to reach these percentages, his 
argument might be colorable. As he made no such effort, he can not credibly 
argue that the process and resulting award have no reasonable basis or were 
arbitrary and capricious. 
In sum, regardless of whether one applies a 'clearly erroneous' or 'abuse of 
discretion' standard, Cook's arguments fail. The trial court's findings regarding 
allocation are clearly supported by the record and the law. Its award of fees to RTNC 
must be affirmed. 
22
 The parties sought $473,000 total damages or set-offs on compensable claims -
$183,000 by RTNC and $290,000 by Cook. [See Addendum 5; Cook's Supp. 
Interrogatory Answer No. 30. RTNC prevailed on all but $19,500 of this total amount, or 
96%. [(473,000 - 19,500) -s- 473,000 = 0.96 or 96%] 
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4. RTNC Established That Its Counsel's Billing Rates Were Consistent 
With Those Customarily Charged for Similar Services in the 
Locality. 
Cook argues that RTNC failed to provide evidence that the rates in its fee 
application were consistent with rates customarily charged for similar services in the 
locality. Once again Cook attacks an express finding of fact by the trial court 
[Addendum 4; Findings at f 21] and, once again, Cook applies the wrong standard of 
appellate review and fails to meet his burden under the applicable standard. 
Preliminarily, Cook ignores the standard of proof applicable to this element 
of RTNC's fee application. Rule 4-505 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
required RTNC in its fee application to "affirm the reasonableness of the fees for 
comparable legal services" (emphasis added). RTNC did this twice [R. 2382 at U 5 and 
2073 at 1f 5] and the trial court so found [Addendum 4; Findings at f 22]. Cook offered 
no evidence controverting RTNC's evidence regarding rates and, again, the trial court so 
found. [Id] 
Cook again fails to apply the 'clearly erroneous' standard in his analysis. 
In this regard, Cook does not just fail to marshal this evidence in support of the trial 
court's findings, he simply ignores it. He also fails to demonstrate that the evidence he 
ignored is against the great weight of controverting evidence he never produced. The trial 
court clearly did not err in making this finding, nor did it abuse its broad discretion in this 
aspect of its award of fees to RTNC. The trial court's fee award to RTNC must be 
affirmed. 
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C. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF FEES TO RTNC WAS 
PROPER. 
Having lived with this case for three years, including but not limited to 
three different Cook attorneys, a two-week trial that was once continued, and multiple 
dispositive motions and discovery motions, the trial court was in a particularly unique 
position to assess the merit of RTNCs fee application. Its award is based upon a fee 
application that fully comports with applicable law and upon express findings of fact 
based on the only evidence submitted. Cook has failed to demonstrate that these findings 
of fact were clearly erroneous. He has also failed to show that the trial court's award 
lacks any "reasonable basis", was "arbitrary and capricious," or otherwise constitutes a 
clear abuse of the trial court's broad discretion. The trial court's award of fees to Cook 
must be affirmed. 
IV. COOK IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEY FEES. 
Cook asserts that he was the only party to prevail on a claim for breach of 
the written Services Agreement and, as such, is entitled to recover his attorney fees for 
that effort. [Cook Brief p. 41] He further asserts that the trial erred in ruling that RTNC 
was the only prevailing party in this litigation. This argument is without merit for several 
reasons, all of which stem from the fact that Cook ignores what transpired in the court 
below. 
As previously demonstrated, Cook was not the only party to prevail on a 
claim for breach of the Services Agreement. Per the jury's verdict, RTNC prevailed on 
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its claim that Cook breached the Modified Services Agreement and received a verdict for 
the full amount sought. [R. 1941-1942] 
Further, RTNC was the prevailing party on the vast majority of Cook's 
compensable breach of contract and other, overlapping, counterclaims. [R. 1944-1946] 
In his Answer and Counterclaim, Cook alleged nine different breaches of contract on the 
part of RTNC and sought damages for these alleged breaches in excess of $225,000.23 
Prior to trial, RTNC secured summary judgment as to three of these alleged breaches. 
[R. 1742-1745] At trial, RTNC defeated another four of these alleged breaches and part 
of a fifth.24 In short, during the course of litigation RTNC defeated seven of Cook's nine 
breach of contract counterclaims and part of an eighth, and disproved more than $270,000 
of Cook's $290,000 in damage and set-off claims. [See n.22] Of the $19,500 set-off 
obtained by Cook at trial, substantially less than one-half of that amount had actually 
23
 Specifically, Cook alleged that RTNC breached the Services Agreement to 
Cook's damage as follows: (i) failure to retrieve campaign lawn signs after the general 
election; (ii) conducting unreliable polls; (iii) misappropriating (conversion of) polling 
reports; (iv) over-billing for consulting services; (v) billing for post-election consulting ; 
(vi) over-billing for primary win bonus; (vii) billing for GOTV calls made by persons 
other than RTNC personnel; (viii) over-charging for expenses, and; (ix) charging a 
commission for political party campaign contributions. [Addendum 5; Cook's Supp. 
Answers to Interrogatories at pp. 2-4] He sought set-offs of $220,000 and damages of 
$70,000 for these claims. 
24
 The jury no-caused Cook on his claims that RTNC breached the modified 
Services Agreement by over-billing for consulting services, billing for post-election 
consulting services, over-billing for the primary win bonus, and billing for GOTV calls 
made by persons other than RTNC personnel. It also rejected a portion of Cook's breach 
of contract claim that RTNC had over-charged for expenses. 
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been paid by Cook.25 Simply stated, by the time the dust had settled follow iiig ti lal, 
RTNC had in terms of damages and set-offs prevailed on more than 93% of Cook's 
compensable counterclaims and more than 96% of all compensable and overlapping 
claims litigated below. 
Because RTNC prevailed on its breach of contract claims and successfully 
defended the vast majority of Cook's breach of contract counterclaims, it is the prevailing 
party on these claims. As such, it is the only party entitled to recover attorney fees. 
Indeed, some cases suggest that RTNC's decisive victory in (his matin subsumes its 
failure to prevail on a portion of Cook's counterclaims and that RTNC is entitled to an 
award of all fees incurred in this matter. See, e.g., Jane L. v. Bangerter. 61 F.3d 1505, 
1512 (10th Or. 1995); Durant v. Independent School District No. 16, 990 F.2d 560, 566 
(10th Or. 1993). 
Here, the trial court ordered RTNC to segregate, inter alia, fees it incurred 
in its unsuccessful effort to eliminate the tattered remnants of Cook's compensable 
counterclaims and RTNC has done so. No further adjustment, such as awarding Cook 
attorney fees for securing a de minimis set-off against RTNC's decisive victory, is 
warranted. 
25
 Trial Exhibit 153 [Addendum 3], reconciled RTNC's charges and Cook's 
payments for election-phase services and served as RTNC's principal damages exhibit at 
trial. Invoices appearing in bold were invoices not paid by Cook. RTNC's commission 
charges of app. $11,500 for political party contributions were invoiced along with all 
other PAC commissions. As Ex. 153 demonstrates, Cook failed to pay any amount on 
any of the PAC invoices. 
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CONCLUSION 
Cook's arguments on appeal are without merit. RTNC requests that the 
Court affirm the trial court's judgment in its entirety. Alternatively, should the Court 
reverse the trial court's judgment for principal and interest for services rendered by 
RTNC, RTNC requests that the same be remanded for retrial as appropriate. Further, 
should the Court reverse the trial court's award of attorney fees to RTNC for any reason, 
RTNC requests that the issue of fees be remanded to the trial court for further taking of 
evidence and findings by the trial court as this Court deems appropriate. RTNC further 
requests attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this 22nd day of March, 2001. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
my T3 ^_
/CKAIGC.COBURN J ^ 
HUJSSELL C. FERICKS 
BASTIAAN K. COEBERGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
R.T. Nielson Company 
347903 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of March, 2001, two true and correct 
copies of the BRIEF OF APPELLEE were mailed, first class, postage prepaid, to I he 
following: 
Blake S. Atkin 
Jonathan L. Hawkins 
Atkin & Lilja, P.C. 
136 South Main, 6th floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
CCA/} 
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Tabl 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. VL 
FORM OF CONTRACT 
A contract or modification of a contract may be written or oral. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ^ M 
(»R \L MODIFK \ I ION OF WRITTEN CONTRACT 
Parties to a written contract are free to modify that contract by oral or verbal 
agreement, even though the written contract may prohibit oral or verbal modifications or 
require that modifications be in writing. 
c 1 n n ° 
fab 2 
P f t * DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 1 4 2000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
R. T. NIELSON COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MERRILL COOK, et al., 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
Civil No. 970904869CV 
Hon. Sandra Peuler 
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES 
R.T. Nielson Co.'s Claims: 
1. Did the R.T. Nielson Co. and Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook for Congress Committee 
modify their Services Agreement as alleged by the R.T. Nielson Co.? 
Yes No 
5704.0001; 295170 
If your answer to 1. is "No", go directly to 4. Do not complete 2. or 3. 
If your answer to 1. is "Yes", did Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook for Congress 
Committee breach their contract with the R.T. Nieison Co. as modified by failing to pay the 
R.T. Nieison Co. as agreed and/or violating the covenant of good faith and fair dealing? 
Yes V No 
If your answer to 2. is "Yes", in what amount did the breach damage the R.T. Nieison Co.? 
$ / r L, ^ F A 
If you have completed this item 3., go directly to 8. Do not complete 4. through 7. 
Were the infrastructure and polling services provided during the primary and general 
election cycles covered by the written Services Agreement? 
Yes No 
If your answer to 4. was "Yes", go directly to 8. Do not complete 5. through 7. 
If your answer to 4. was "No", is the R.T. Nieison Co. entitled to recover the reasonable 
value of those services from Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook for Congress Committee 
under an unjust enrichment or quantum meruit theory? 
Yes No 
3704.0001; 295170 -2-
6. If your answer to 5. is "Yes", what is the reasonable value of the infrastructure and polling 
services provided by the R.T. Nielson Co.? 
$ 
7. In addition to the value stated in 9., what amount is due the R.T. Nielson Co. under the 
Services Agreement for unpaid fundraising, GOTV, bonus, and/or expense invoices, after 
crediting payments made by Merrill Cook and/or the Merrill Cook for Congress Commitee 
for primary and general cycle services and costs? 
$ 
8. Is the R.T. Nielson Co. entitled to recover, under an implied contract or unjust enrichment 
theory, from Merrill Cook for consulting services, equipment rental, and office rental during 
the post-election or transition cycle? 
Yes V No 
9. If your answer to 8. is "No", go directly to 10. Do not complete 9. 
If your answer to 8. is "Yes", what is the reasonable value of the consulting services, 
equipment rental, and office rental provided by the R.T. Nielson Co. during the post-
election or transition cycle? 
$ / / , . v - ? 
13704.0001; 295170 - 3 -
MCC's Claims: 
10. Did the R.T. Nielson Co. have a fiduciary relationship with Merrill Cook and the Merrill 
Cook for Congress Committee? 
Yes No \ / 
11. If your answer to 10. is "No", go directly to 12. Do not complete 11. 
If your answer to 10. is "Yes", did the R.T. Nielson Co. breach a fiduciary duty to Merrill 
Cook and the Merrill Cook for Congress Committee as alleged by Merrill Cook and the 
Merrill Cook for Congress Committee? 
Yes No 
12. Did Ronald Nielson have a fiduciary relationship with Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook 
for Congress Committee? 
Yes No \y' 
13. If your answer to 12. is "No", go directly to 14. Do not complete 13. 
If your answer to 12. is "Yes", did Ronald Nielson breach a fiduciary duty to Merrill Cook 
and the Merrill Cook for Congress Committee as alleged by Merrill Cook and the Merrill 
Cook for Congress Committee? 
Yes No 
13704.0001; 295170 -4-
14. If your answer to 11. is "Yes", did this breach invalidate the Services Agreement and any 
oral modifications of the Services Agreement in their entirety. 
Yes No 
If your answer to 14. Is "Yes", you can not award damages to either party on their breach of 
contract claims. You may however award either party recovery under their unjust 
enrichment claims. 
15. If your answers to 11. and 13. are "No", go directly to 16. Do not complete 15. 
If your answer to either 11. or 13. is "Yes" and your answer to 14. Is "No", in what amount 
if any did said breach damage Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook for Congress Committee? 
$ 
If you have completed this item 15., go directly to the section entitled VERDICT. Do not 
complete 16. through 17. 
16. Did the R.T. Nieison Co. breach the Services Agreement as alleged by Merrill Cook and the 
Merrill Cook for Congress Committee, including the breach of covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing? 
Yes l/^ No 
13704 0001, 295170 -5 -
17. If your answer to 16. is "No", go directly to 18. Do not complete 17. 
If your answer to 16. is "Yes'\ in what amount if any did said breach damage Merrill Cook 
and the Merrill Cook for Congress Committee? 
$ ''^--^H-h hi, •') ll 
If you have completed this item 17 , go directly to the section entitled VERDICT. Do not 
complete 18. through 19. 
18. Has the R.T. Nielson Co. been unjustly enriched as alleged by Merrill Cook and the Merrill 
Cook for Congress Committee? 
Yes No 
19. If your answer to 18. is "No", go directly to the section entitled VERDICT. Do not 
complete 19. 
If your answer to 18. is "Yes", in what amount has the R.T. Nielson Co. been unjustly 
enriched by Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook for Congress Committee? 
$ 
13704 0001; 295170 -6-
VERDICT 
We the jury in the above-captioned matter, find as follows: 
We find in favor of the plaintiff. R.T. Nielson Co. as follows: 
Item 3. - Breach of Contract (if applicable) 
Item 6. plus Item 7. - Unjust Enrichment and 
Contract Balance (if applicable) 
Item 9. - Breach of Implied Contract or 
Unjust Enrichment (if applicable) 
TOTAL 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
f ~ L 
it, 
i 73 
. H$ -; 
e 
6 c V 
We find in favor of the defendants. Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook for Congress Committee, as 
follows: 
Item 15. - Breach of Fiduciary Duty (if applicable) $. 
Item 17. - Breach of Contract (if applicable) $_ 
Item 19. - Unjust Enrichment (if applicable) $_ 
TOTAL $ 
irH \<JS>'M 
77 , -1'ft ic\,bi\ 
DATED this H day of. 
*4 kr_J_ ., \9-yCCC. 
- < - - « - < • — " - - = 
Foreperson 
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Tab 3 
ACCOUNTING -
RUNNING BALANCE TOTAL 
Pre-Convention/Convention $ 2,086 
Primary Election 14,752 
General Election 166,136 
Post-Election 11.509 
Adjustment: (491) 
(Double Billings) 
TOTAL $ 193,992 
PRIMARY ELECTION - ACCOUNTING 
w 
Jp0-May-96 
1 15-May-96 
J I5-May«96 
ff 2Q.May.96 
I 15-May-96 
3-Jul-96 
|J^Vfay-96 
| | ^ . J u l - 9 6 
21-May-96 
||31-May-96 
31-May-96 
| 6-Jun.96 
31-May-96 
J 3-Jul-96 
7-Jun-96 
I 3-Jul-96 
7.Jun-96 
J 20-Jun-96 1 
18-Jun-96 
J 3-Jul-96 1 
18-Jun-96 
J 3-M-96 
24-Jun-96 
|^3-Jul-96 
24-Jun-96 
J 21.Jun-96 
26.Jun-96 
1 7-Aug-96 1 
J 26-Jun-96 | 
******** 
29.Jui.96 
5-Sep-96 
16.Sep.96 
18-Sep-96 
19-Sep-96 
l-Oct-96 
7-Oct-96 
1 15-Oct-96 
Invoice 
No. 
96148 
96150 
' 96151 
96153 
96154 
96162 
96163 ! 
96165 
96166 
96168 
96169 
96170 
96171 
96172 
96173 
***** 
96199 
Amount 
($) 
8,333 
8,333 
933 
251 
8,333 
8,333 
1,005 
1,039 
8,333 
8,333 
2,178 
306 
579 
5,000 
9,252 
***** 
50,000 
120,543 
For 
Consulting Fee 
Consulting Fee 
! Expenses 
Expenses 
Consulting Fee 
Consulting Fee 
Expenses 
Expenses 
Consulting Fee 
Consulting Fee 
Expenses 
Expenses 
Expenses 
(Rally) 
Bonus 
GOTV 
**** 
Primary 
Election 
Bonus* 
Check 
No. 
136 
140 
196 
196 
163 
167 
196 
196 
182 
195 
196 
196 
187 
203 
*** 
212 
215 
216 
217 
227 
232 
246 
Amount 
ffl 
8,333 j 
8,333 
933 
251 
8,333 
8,333 
1,005 
1,039 
8,333 
8,333 
2,178 
306 
579 
5,000 
***** 
8,000 
5,000 
5,000 
2,500 
8,000 
8,000 
8,000 
105,791 
Invoice 
Balance ($) 1 
8,333 
-0-
8,333 
-0- ! 
933 
-0-
251 
-0-
8,333 
-0-
8,333 
-0-
1,005 
-0-
1,039 
j -0-
8,333 
-0-
8,333 
-0-
2,178 
-0-
306 
-0-
579 
-0-
5,000 
-0-
9,252 
***** 
50,000 
42,000 
37,000 
32,000 
29,500 
21,500 
13,500 
5,500 
* * ^ * J 
Running 1 
Balance (S\ | 
8,3331 
-0-1 
8,333| 
-0-1 
933| 
-0-J 
2511 
-0 - | 
8,333fl 
-0-J 
8,333 
-0-J 
1,005 J 
-0-J 
1,039 
-0-J 
8,333 I 
-0-J 
8,333 
-0-J 
2,178 
-0-J 
306 
-0-J 
579 
-0- | 
5,000 
-0-j 
9,252 J 
***** 
59,252 
51,2521 
46,252 
41,252 
38,752 
30,752 
22,752 J 
14,752 J 
$14,7521 
«| This $50,000 was originally billed as 'Consulting Fee for General Election' under Invoice No. 96182 (also ed 29-Jul-96; total amount invoiced $150,000). Invoice No. 96182 was voided and split into Invoice No. 96199 
($50,000 - Primary Election Bonus) and Invoice No. 96200 (for $100,000 - Consulting Fee for General Election) in 
August 1996 
Pate 
! 22-Feb-96 
1 5-Mar-96 
I-Mar-96 
( 5-Mar-96 
4-Mar-96 
i s .Mar .96 
1 f i \ l a r -96 
J 19-Mar-96 
26-Mar-96 
i-Apr-96 
19-Apr-96 
29-Apr-96 
J 7-Mar-96 
8-Mar-96 
J 13-Mar-96 
18-Mar-96 
26-Mar-96 
J l-Apr-96 
18-Mar-96 
J 19-Mar-96 
22-Mar-96 
J 26-Mar-96 
8-Apr-96 
1 15-Apr-96 
I! I Apr-96 | 
j 15-Apr-96 i 
iO-Apr-96 
j 15-Apr-96 
23-Apr-96 | 
j 7-May-96 | 
23-Apr-96 j 
30-Apr-96 
j 2-May-96 
29-Apr-96 ' 
J 7-May-96 
3-May-96 ! 
1 7-May-96 
3-May-96 
j 7-May-96 
1
 May-96 
j 6-May-96 j 
Invoice 
96113 
96116 
96118 
96125 
96126 
96127 
96131 
96133 
96134 
96136 
96138 
96139 
96141 ' 
96142 
96143 
96144 
96145 
Amount 
(?) . 
4,999 
1,285 
40,000 
1,215 
12,000 
1,112 
2,422 
1,158 
4,386 
423 
4,215 
7,175 
3,450 j 
4,407 
7,052 j 
4,787 
5,000 
_H)52086j 
For 
Polling 
Stationary 
Convention 
Management; 
Room Usage 
and Office 
Equipment 
Expenses 
Voter ID. 
Survey; GOTV 
Expenses 
Expenses 
Expenses 
Delegate 
Poll #2 
Expenses 
Expenses 
Expenses 
Expenses 
Expenses 
Expenses 
Expenses 
Bonus 
Check 
[ n 
1 l 
[ 3 
2 
103 
109 
111 
115 
119 
123 
132 
102 
111 
114 
109 
111 
119 
119 
119 
132 
125 
132 
129 
132 
132 
132 
Amount 
1 ($) 
4,999 
1,285 
8,000 
1 4,000 
4,000 
4,000 
4,000 
8,000 
2,000 
6,000 
1,215 
3,000 
9,000 
1,112 
2,422 
1,158 j 
4,386 
423 j 
4,215 1 
5,000 
2,175 j 
8,000 j 
3,450 j 
4,407 j 
6,753 1 
103^000 | 
Invoice 
[ Balance (S) 
4,999 
-0-
1,285 
-0-
40,000 
32,000 
28,000 
24,000 
20,000 
16,000 
8,000 
6,000 
-0-
1,215 
-0-
12,000 
9,000 
-0-
1,112 
-0-
2,422 
-0-
1,158 
-0-
4,386 
-0- ! 
423 
-0- j 
4,215 j 
-0-
7,175 
2,175 
-0-
******* 
3,450 
-0-
4,407 
- 0 - j 
7,052 
299 1 
4,787 1 
5,000 1 
sje sje sje J(C jfc sjc 3je 
Running 
1 Balance ($] 
4,99 
-C 
1 1,28 
i -0 
[ 40,00< 
' 32,00( 
28,00( 
24,00( 
20,00( 
16,00( 
8,00C 
6,00C 
-0-
1,215 
-0-
12,000 
9,000 
-0-
1,112 
-0-
2,422 
-0-
1,158 
-0-
4,386 
-0-
423 
-0-
4,2151 
-0-
7,175 
2,175 
-0-| 
(8,000) j 
(4,550) 
(8,000) j 
(3,593) 
(8,000) J 
(948)1 
(7,701) 
(2,914) j 
2,086 J 
S2.086 
V f29-Jul-% 
| 2 9 - J u l - 9 6 
I 2i-Oct-96 
I 29-Oct-96 
If 12-Sep-96 
| 12-Sep-96 
K^-Sep-96 
15-Oct-96 
I 15-Oct-96 
1 16-Oct-96 
16-Oct-96 
1 16-Oct-96 
J 8-Nov-96 
J 8-Nov-96 1 
J 8-Nov-96 I 
| 8-Nov-96 J 
J 26-Nov-96 1 
1 26-Nov-96 1 
J 10-Dec-96 
1 20-Jan-97 
WFeb-97 
Invoice 
1 # 
[ 96184 
1 96200 
96212 
96213 
96235 
96255 
96256 
96257 
96355 
96356 
96357 
96359 
96366 J 
96367 
96372 
97106 
97112 
Amount 
i i a_ -
!,«»« 
100,000 
3,250 
2,667 
2,863 
1,900 
1,083 
2,716 
23,828 
12,319 
25,000 
2,499 
563 
404 
2,213 
2,318 
1,294 
186,752 
For 
Expenses 
Consulting Fee 
Gen. Election 
Expenses (DC) 
Expenses 
Expenses 
Expenses 
(Gingrich) 
Expenses 
Expenses 
(Kinko's) 
PAC 
GOTV 
Bonus 
Expenses 
Expenses 
PAC 
PAC 
PAC 
EXP 
Check 
_ # 
252 
263 1 
245 
248 
Amount 
($) 1 
8,000 
8,000 J 
i 1,900 
1 2,716 
20,616 
Invoice 
Balance ($) | 
1,838 1 
100,000 
92,000 
84,000 
3,250 J 
2,667 | 
2,863 
1,900 
-0-
1 1,083 
1 2,716 
J -0-
1 23,828 
| 12,319 
J 25,000 
J 2,499 
J 563 
404 
J 2,213 
1 2,318 
1 1,294 
****** 
Running 1 
Balance (S) \ 
1,838 J 
101,8381 
93,8381 
85,838 J 
89,088 \ 
9 \ J 5 4 | 
1 
94,6171 
96,517 
94,6171 
95,7001 
98,416| 
) 95,700 J 
1 119,528 J 
1 131,846 J 
1 156,846 J 
1 159,345 j 
J 159,908 j 
1 160,312 J 
1 162,524 J 
1 164,842 j 
| 166,136 J 
1 $1664361 
Tab 4 
Craig C. Coburn [A0688] 
Russell C. Fericks [A3793] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for R. T. Nielson Company 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801)531-2000 
Facsimile: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
R. T. NIELSON COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MERRILL COOK, et al., 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
Civil No. 970904869CV 
Hon. Sandra N. Peuler 
The Court, having reviewed and considered plaintiffs Supplemental Affidavit of 
Attorneys Fees and Costs, defendants' Objection to RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of Attorneys 
Fees and Costs, and plaintiffs Reply to that Objection, makes the following findings of fact and 
reaches the following conclusions of law in support of its award of attorneys fees to plaintiff: 
rHJffl DISTRICT COURT 
Third -lird^s! District 
C I . 2 <: 2330 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This dispute arose out of services rendered and expenses incurred by plaintiff 
R.T. Nielson Co. ("RTNC") for or on behalf defendants Merrill Cook and the Merrill Cook for 
Congress Committee (collectively "Cook") during and following Cook's 1996 congressional 
campaign. 
2. In March 1996, RTNC and Cook entered into a written Services Agreement 
whereby, inter alia, RTNC agreed to provide services for Cook's 1996 congressional campaign and 
Cook agreed to pay for those services. The Services Agreement contains the contractual provision 
giving rise to RTNC's claim for attorneys fees. 
3. RTNC claimed that the parties twice orally modified the Services Agreement 
to expand and extend RTNC's services and that Cook failed to pay RTNC as agreed under the 
modified Services Agreement. Cook denied these claims. 
4. RTNC first brought suit against Cook in January 1997. Shortly thereafter, 
that suit was voluntarily dismissed by RTNC without prejudice and the parties engaged in direct 
negotiations and in a mediation in an effort to resolve their dispute. These efforts failed. 
5. RTNC refiled suit against Cook in July 1997, and Cook counterclaimed. 
RTNC's claims, which were plead in the alternative, included breach of contract, account stated, 
and quantum meruit. Cook's counterclaims, some of which were plead in the alternative, included 
breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty against RTNC, and breach of 
fiduciary duty against RTNC's principal agent, Ronald T. Nielson. 
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6. Out of all of RTNCs and Cook's claims, only those alleging breach of the 
Services Agreement, if and as modified, were ostensibly compensable with regard to attorneys fees. 
7. The parties' respective claims were based upon the same facts. Specifically, 
they were based upon the services provided and expenses incurred by RTNC during and following 
Cook's 1996 congressional campaign and Cook's payment or failure to pay for those services and 
expenses. Similarly, the legal theories underlying the parties' claims were interrelated and most 
claims were plead in the alternative. 
8. The relevant time period for the parties' dispute was early 1996 through 
December 1996. For purposes of this discussion, this time period is comprised of two distinct 
components. The first time period ("the election phase"), ran from early 1996 through November 
5, 1996, the date of the 1996 General Election and the date upon which the Services Agreement 
expired of its own accord. The second time period ("the post-election phase") ran from November 
6 through December, 1996. 
9. The bulk of RTNC's claims and of Cook's counterclaims arose out of the 
election phase. This phase encompassed at least 80% of the total relevant time period. Further, 
approximately $182,000 of RTNC's total claim of $194,000 (i.e., 94%) was for services rendered 
and expenses incurred during the election phase. A similar proportionality applies to Cook's 
counterclaims. 
10. There was, effectively, complete factual overlap as to the various claims 
each party asserted against the other. Specifically: 
-3-
a. RTNC's alternative claims for election phase services and expenses (i.e., its 
compensable breach of contract claim and its noncompensable unjust enrichment 
and account stated claims) were based upon the same facts (e.g., conversations, 
services, expenses, invoices, payments, nonpayments, notes, and other evidence 
from the election phase). 
b. Cook's compensable breach of contract claim and his noncompensable 
claims regarding the election phase were based on these same facts. 
In short, the prosecution and defense of RTNC's and Cook's compensable and noncompensable 
election phase claims required proof of what transpired during the election phase. Similarly, 
RTNC's and Cook's claims related to the post-election phase (none of which were compensable) 
required proof of the same facts, albeit a different set of facts than the election phase claims. 
11. As more specifically itemized in RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of 
Attorneys Fees and Costs, this litigation included, inter alia, the following activities: 
a. Extensive written discovery undertaken by both RTNC and Cook; 
b. Multiple depositions, including several that lasted two or more days; 
c. Multiple discovery-related motions (with RTNC prevailing on the majority 
of these motions); 
d. Multiple dispositive motions (with RTNC prevailing on the majority of these 
motions); 
e. Multiple pretrial motions; 
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f. Jury selection which, due to media interest, entailed a greater effort by the 
parties (e.g., a jury questionnaire, in-chambers voir dire, larger jury pool); 
g. Ten (10) days of trial; and, 
h. Extensive post-trial proceedings, primarily with regard to attorneys fees. 
12. The vast majority of RTNC's litigation effort through trial was spent 
developing and presenting RTNC's claims for services rendered and expenses incurred during the 
election phase (i.e., its compensable breach of contract claim and its overlapping but 
noncompensable alternative unjust enrichment and other claims). 
13. RTNC spent a modest amount of time developing its unjust enrichment 
claim for post-election services and expenses. This claim was based on a simple legal principle and 
limited facts (i.e., a single invoice and limited testimony from a handful of witnesses). 
14. RTNC spent a modest amount of time prior to trial addressing Cook's 
claims. Several of these claims were dismissed on summary judgment before trial. These 
dismissals encompassed several elements of Cook's compensable breach of contract claim and his 
alternative unjust enrichment, fiduciary duty, and other noncompensable claims. 
15. Significant portions of both parties' litigation efforts were not claim-specific 
(e.g., discovery and evidentiary motions, credibility, procedural matters and motions). 
16. The case was tried to a jury in April 2000. The only claims tried to the jury 
were: (i) RTNC's claim that Cook breached the modified Services Agreement; (ii) RTNC's 
overlapping, alternative unjust enrichment claim for election phase services and expenses; (iii) 
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RTNC's unjust enrichment claim for post-election services and expenses; (iv) the remaining 
elements of Cook's claim that RTNC breached the Services Agreement; and, (v) Cook's unjust 
enrichment and breach of fiduciary duty claims against RTNC and Ronald Nielson. 
17. The jury found, inter alia, that: (i) RTNC and Cook had orally modified the 
Services Agreement as alleged by RTNC; (ii) Cook had breached the parties' modified contract by 
failing to pay RTNC as agreed; (iii) RTNC had overcharged Cook for certain expenses; (iv) RTNC 
was not entitled to a commission on funds contributed to Cook by political party committees; (iv) 
Cook had been unjustly enriched by the services provided and expenses incurred by RTNC during 
the post-election phase; and, (v) all of Cook's other counterclaims were without merit. Further, 
RTNC's overlapping, alternative unjust enrichment claim for election phase services and expenses 
was eliminated as a matter of law by the jury's finding that the Services Agreement had been 
modified by the parties to include said services and expenses. 
18. With the jury's verdict, RTNC prevailed on its compensable breach of 
contract claim and had successfully defended seven of the nine elements of Cook's compensable 
breach of contract claims. These seven elements encompassed the vast majority of damages or set-
offs sought by Cook. Further, having sought approximately $194,000 in total damages, RTNC 
received a net verdict in its favor of approximately $175,000, including some $163,000 for Cook's 
breach of the modified Services Agreement. 
19. Based upon the foregoing, this Court previously ruled that RTNC was the 
prevailing party under applicable law and that RTNC was entitled to recover reasonable attorneys 
fees from Cook for its successful prosecution or defense of compensable claims. 
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20. In its August 8, 2000, Minute Entry, this Court rejected RTNC's initial fee 
application and invited RTNC to supplement that application by: (i) itemizing the specific work 
performed and time spent in each aspect of the work by each individual employed by RTNC's 
counsel; and (ii) segregating this time and effort between compensable and noncompensable 
claims. 
21. RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs, including 
specifically Exhibit 1 thereto, accomplished these objectives. Specifically, it: 
a. sets forth the legal basis for an award of attorneys fees; 
b. itemizes, identifies and describes the specific work actually performed by 
each member of RTNC's legal team; 
c. sets forth the number of hours spent by each member of RTNC's legal team 
in pursuing this matter; 
d. affirms that the hourly rates upon which RTNC's fee application is based 
and the total fee award sought are reasonable and customary for comparable legal 
services in this area; 
e. articulates a reasonable and rational basis for segregating and allocating 
RTNC's attorneys fees between compensable and noncompensable claims; and, 
f. reasonably segregates and allocates RTNC's attorneys fees between 
compensable and noncompensable claims. 
22. Cook offers no evidence refuting RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of 
Attorneys Fees and Costs, including but not limited to RTNC's evidence of: (i) the nature, 
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reasonableness, and necessity of the work actually performed; (ii) the time expended by any 
member of RTNC's legal team on compensable and noncompensable claims; (iii) the factual 
overlap between compensable and noncompensable claims; (iv) the reasonableness of the fees 
sought; and (v) the consistency of the rates with those customarily charged for similar legal 
services in this area. 
23. Based upon RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs 
and the Court's personal familiarity with this complicated, high-profile, and hotly-contested 
litigation, the legal work performed by RTNC's counsel was reasonably necessary to adequately 
prosecute this matter. In this vein, it is noted that the time spent by RTNC's counsel through trial 
and the fees sought by RTNC are, as evidenced by Cook's own fee application, comparable to the 
hours and fees of Cook's counsel through trial. 
24. RTNC's reasonable attorneys fees through September 5, 2000, the date of 
RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs, were $233,326.00. 
25. Of this amount, $195,800.93 represents reasonable attorneys fees through 
said date for the successful prosecution of compensable claims in this matter, the successful 
defense of compensable counterclaims in this matter, and the successful prosecution or defense of 
noncompensable claims or counterclaims in this matter which overlapped factually with said 
compensable claims and counterclaims. 
26. The remaining $37,525.07 represents reasonable attorneys fees for the 
unsuccessful defense of compensable counterclaims, and the successful prosecution or defense of 
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noncompensable claims or counterclaims in this matter which did not overlap factually with any of 
the compensable claims or counterclaims upon which RTNC prevailed. 
27. RTNC's cost for the court-ordered mediation was $525.00. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. RTNC's Supplemental Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs complies with 
the requirements of Rule 4-505, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, with this Court's August 8, 
2000, Minute Entry, and with applicable case law. It is otherwise sufficient to meet RTNC's 
burden of proof in supporting its requested award. 
2. The $525.00 incurred by RTNC for the court-ordered mediation is a 
recoverable cost under Rule 54(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be taxed as a cost as 
against both defendants, jointly and severally. 
3. The compensable claims and counterclaims in this litigation were the 
parties' respective claims that the other had breached the modified written Services Agreement. 
4. As the prevailing party, RTNC is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys 
fees for: 
a. successfully prosecuting or defending these compensable claims or 
counterclaims; 
b. successfully prosecuting or defending noncompensable claims or 
counterclaims which overlapped factually with the aforesaid compensable claims 
and counterclaims; and, 
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c. general litigation efforts not directly related to specific claim or 
counterclaim. 
5. RTNC is not entitled to recover attorneys fees associated with its 
unsuccessful defense of compensable counterclaims, nor for its successful prosecution or defense 
of noncompensable claims or counterclaims which did not overlap factually with compensable 
claims or counterclaims upon which it prevailed. 
6. Reasonable attorneys through September 5, 2000, for successfully 
prosecuting or defending the compensable claims or counterclaims and overlapping 
noncompensable claims or counterclaims in this matter were $195,800.93. 
7. RTNC is entitled to judgment for attorneys fees in said amount against both 
defendants, jointly and severally, and for the damages heretofore awarded by the jury, for Rule 
54(d) costs awarded by the Court, and for pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as allowed by 
law. 
DATED this H day of December, 2000. 
By the Court: ,, " v 
Hpn. Sandra N. Peuler 
Third Judicial District Court 
Approved as to Form: 
Blake S. Atkin 
Jonathon L. Hawkins 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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Attorneys for Defendants and 
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs Merrill Cook and 
Merrill Cook for Congress Committee 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
R.T. NIELSON COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MERRILL COOK FOR CONGRESS 
COMMITTEE, a Federal Election 
Campaign Committee, and MERRILL 
COOK, an individual, 
Defendants. 
MERRILL COOK FOR CONGRESS 
COMMITTEE and MERRILL COOK, 
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
R.T. NIELSON COMPANY and RONALD 
NIELSON, 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST 
SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
Civil No. 970904869 CV 
Honorable Sandra Peuler 
Counterclaim-Defendants. 
Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants, Merrill 
Cook for Congress Committee ("Cook Committee") and Merrill Cook ("Cook"), submit 
this supplemental response to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories. 
RESERVATION OF RIGHTS 
Defendants incorporate the Reservation of Rights set forth in Defendants' 
Response to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories. 
GENERAL OBJECTIONS 
Defendants incorporate the General Objections set forth in Defendants1 
Response to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories. 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 30: State the factual basis for the allegations contained in 
the Nineteenth Defense of your Answer. In your answer to this interrogatory please: 
a. Identify each and every person who to your knowledge, information or 
belief has any knowledge regarding said allegations; 
b. Identify each and every person whom you intend to call as a witness 
(expert or otherwise) at trial in support of or regarding said allegations; 
c. Set forth the substance and basis of the knowledge of the individuals you 
have identified in sub-parts a. and b. of this interrogatory; 
2 
d. Identify each and every document upon which any said individual relies to 
support their knowledge or testimony or which otherwise relates to the subject 
matter thereof; 
e. Identify the custodian(s) of each and every document identified in the 
immediately preceding sub-interrogatory; 
f. Provide an itemized listing of any and all damages claimed. 
RESPONSE: In addition to the information in defendants1 earlier response to this 
interrogatory, defendants state as follows: 
The Nineteenth Defense in defendants' Answer is that "[a]ny damages awarded to 
plaintiff must offset by the damages to defendants." 
a.-e. Defendants incorporate their responses to Interrogatory Nos. 2, 28, and 
72 in this supplemental response. 
f. Defendants itemize "any and all damages claimed" as follows: 
Overpayments 
1. Total of Invoices $423,889.93 
2. Amounts Improperly Invoiced 
a. Overcharges for consulting $133,083.23 
(Invoices 96148, 96150, 96154, 
96162,96166,96168,96200, 
97106) 
b. Overcharge for primary election 50,000.00 
bonus 
(Invoice 96199) 
c. Overcharges for expenses, 19,375.99 
including self-dealing 
d. Overcharges for PAC fundraising 11,317.50 
(Invoices 96355, 96367, 96372) 
e. Overcharges for equipment 3,300.00 
rental (Invoices 96143, 97106) 
f. Overcharges for office rental 1,425.45 
(Invoice 97106) 
g. Overcharges for staff time 880.85 
(Invoices 96170, 96171, 96184, 
96256, 96257, 96359) 
h. Double charges for expenses 490.51 
(Invoices 96169, 96235) 
i. Overcharges for GOTV calls Unable to calculate at this time. 
Subtotal: $219,873.531 
3. Total Invoices 423,889.93 
(Amounts Improperly Invoiced) (219.873.53) 
Legitimate Invoices $204,016.40 
4. Amount Paid by Cook 229,657.21 
(Legitimate Invoices) (204.016.40) 
Total Damages for Overpayments $ 25,640.81 
'Also improperly charged were interest charges. See Invoice FC6. Such interest charges have no basis in 
the Services Agreement or any purported oral agreements as alleged by plaintiff. 
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Other Damages 
1. Lost lawn signs 
2. Inadequate polling 
3. Mass mailing through first class 
mail 
4. Misappropriation of voter, 
GOTV, and volunteer 
mailing and address lists 
and polling reports 
5. Misappropriation of contribution from 
Bill Reagan 
Total Other Damages 
TOTAL DAMAGES 
$ 35,000.00 
4,600.00 
6,200.00 
Unable to calculate at this time. 
Unable to calculate at this time. 
$ 45,800.00 
$ 71,440.81 + 
INTERROGATORY NO. 72: State the factual basis for the allegations contained in 
paragraph 38 of your Counterclaim. In your answer to this interrogatory please: 
a. Identify each and every person who to your knowledge, information or belief 
has any knowledge regarding said allegations; 
b. Identify each and every person whom you intend to call as a witness 
(expert or otherwise) at trial in support of or regarding said allegations; 
c. Set forth the substance and basis of the knowledge of the individuals you 
have identified in sub-parts a. and b. of this interrogatory; 
d. Identify each and every document upon which any said individual relies to 
VERIFICATION 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: ss. 
Merrill Cook, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says that he is the signer 
of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS 
FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES; that he has read the foregoing responses; and that 
to the extent of his best knowledge, information, and belief, the responses are true and 
correct. 
Merrill Coo) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me/this £ $ day of, 
My Commission Expires: 
IOTARY 
Residing at 
oym 
' MOTARY PUBLIC 
UDRI DEE SNOW 
7011 So. Horizon Cirde 
St f Uke City, UTB4121 
My Commission Expires 
March 12, 2003 
STATE OF UTAH 
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